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Abstract 
 
The expansion of U.S. military engagement in Africa is based on American 
national security interests. The objective of this research was to add to existing 
evaluations of the U.S. Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM) by taking an in-
depth look at its impact through a case study of Tanzania and sought to answer three 
questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in 
Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity 
in Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian 
public? To answer these questions this assessment utilized secondary source materials, 
content analysis of Tanzanian newspapers and an online discussion forum, and interviews 
with U.S. officials. 
This analysis found that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant command 
than the whole of government command articulated at its inception, and primarily 
emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building. The evidence shows that 
AFRICOM has a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, but fails to 
address human security matters, and the Tanzanian public has a largely negative view of 
the U.S. military organization.  These findings suggest a closer look at policy 
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Traditionally U.S. foreign policy goals have centered on national interest and 
realism, economic development, and more recently the responsibility to protect. Though a 
change began in the late 1990’s, in the aftermath of September 11th U.S. foreign and 
security policy underwent a paradigm shift wherein weak and failing states were seen as 
posing threats equal, and indeed more chronic, to those of the militaries of strong states to 
international and U.S. national security. As detailed by Patrick (2011) this shift in threat 
perceptions in the U.S. and the broader international community are based on two 
propositions. First, traditional conceptions of security should be expanded to include 
cross border threats driven by non-state actors, activities, or forces (such as pandemics or 
environmental degradation). Second, that these cross border threats largely originate and 
emanate from weak and failing states in the developing world. 
In his seminal book on the topic, Patrick (2011) challenged this newly emerged 
consensus through an empirical analysis of the connection between state failure and 
transnational threats, examining the threats of terrorism, transnational crime, WMDs, 
pandemic diseases, and energy insecurity. His analysis finds that that a paradigm wherein 
weak states are the locus from which international security threats emanate is not 
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corroborated empirically and that, as a whole, these states do not pose significant threats 
to the United States. Patrick (2011) also posits that, in addition to being cognizant of the 
tenuous links between state fragility and transnational security threats, the U.S. needs to 
be more strategic in its approach towards fragile states; focusing on preventing 
governance deterioration, reevaluating its development policy, and avoiding an over 
militarization of relations with fragile states.  
After the end of the Cold War and throughout the 1990's, the U.S. struggled with 
defining Africa's security and strategic significance. Having been viewed primarily in 
humanitarian terms, the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar 
es Salaam Tanzania, in August 1998, led to a reevaluation among analysts and policy 
makers of the strategic importance of the region.  
The reconceptualization of threats to transnational and U.S. national security and 
strategic interests, as detailed by Patrick (2011), brought America’s long-standing 
strategic disinterest in the African continent into sharp relief. Through the lens of weak 
and failing states as a threat to U.S. security, Africa could no longer be viewed as a 
peripheral, humanitarian concern (Whelan, 2007).  The 2002 United States National 
Security Strategy devoted a page and a half to Africa in the regional overview section, 
substantially more than any other region. And the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy 
page 37 stated, “Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of 
this Administration.”  
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Within the defense community there was a growing belief that the separation of 
responsibilities for Africa among three combatant commands (Pacific Command, Central 
Command, and European Command) and the uncoordinated and peripheral attention 
resulting from the arrangement, was unsustainable. This view largely stemmed from the 
fact that Africa had steadily begun consuming more time and attention of the three 
commands which were responsible for it.  For example, former EUCOM Commander 
General James L. Jones, said in 2006 EUCOM’s staff were spending at least half their 
time on African issues (Ploch, 2011). Yet it was not until policymakers viewed African 
security threats as congruent with overall global threats to U.S. security and strategic 
interests, that this reorganization and new focus was considered necessary.  
On February 7, 2007 President Bush announced the creation of the U.S. 
combatant command for Africa, known as USAFRICOM, stating  
“This new Command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa 
and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in 
Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security 
to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, 
education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa” (White House News, 
2007).  
 
The creation of AFRICOM, and the reasons articulated for its creation, signaled a 
clear shift in the security consciousness of the U.S. in the wake of September 11
th
.  The 
growing view that “Extreme poverty, ethno-religious divisions, corrupt and weak 
governance, failed states, and large tracts of ‘ungoverned space’ combine to offer what 
many experts believe to be fertile breeding grounds for transnational Islamist terror” 
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(Berschinski, 2007, p. 5), reconfigured Africa’s strategic importance to U.S. national 
security. 
The U.S. Africa Command was touted by officials as being unlike any other 
combatant command. It was articulated as a “combatant command plus” which, 
according to Lauren Ploch (2011, p.4), 
“…implies that the Command has all the roles and responsibilities of a 
traditional geographic combatant command, including the ability to facilitate or lead 
military operations, but also includes a broader “soft power” mandate aimed at 
building a stable security environment and incorporates a larger civilian component 
from other U.S. government agencies to address those challenges…In the view of 
AFRICOM’s architects and proponents, if U.S. agencies, both military and civilian, 
are able to coordinate more efficiently and effectively both among themselves as well 
as with their African partners and other international actors, they might be more 
successful at averting more complex emergencies on the continent.” 
 
In short, the creation of AFRICOM was in response to complex security 
environments, which analysts and policymakers believed required institutionalizing a 
“whole of government” approach. The command’s “whole of government” emphasis was 
premised on the view that interagency interoperability would create a more holistic 
security policy, fostering broader security, and enhancing governance capacity and 
development throughout African countries. This would, in turn, mitigate threats from the 
region, primarily through ameliorating the underlying socio-economic conditions from 
which many security threats stemmed. This approach was also seen as a means to 
establish stronger strategic relationships between the U.S. and African states. If 
AFRICOM succeeded in these efforts, it would be a significant evolution in U.S. military 
engagement abroad representing a shift to one “…mindful of the complicated, 
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interconnected relationships among security, governance, and development”(Berschinski, 
2007, p. 1).  
Prior to AFRICOM’s creation, U.S. Africa policy had settled somewhere in-
between the previous two post-Cold War policy phases: pursuing both humanitarian and 
strategic objectives connected to the larger Global War on Terror (Lawson, 2007). 
Though some Africans were apprehensive about U.S. counter-terror policies, President 
George W. Bush’s emphasis on combatting HIV/AIDS and increasing U.S. development 
assistance helped maintain a high level of public approval of the U.S. throughout Africa. 
The U.S. had positive relations with many West African states, especially with Nigeria, 
Liberia, Ghana, and Senegal. Its partners in the Sahel region included Chad, Mali, Niger, 
and Mauritania. Since the mid-1990’s all of the East African states, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Kenya, and Tanzania, had become close U.S. allies in Africa. All of Southern Africa, 
with the exception of Zimbabwe, had become U.S. allies (Lawson, 2007). 
In the half-decade since AFRICOM’s creation, the U.S. has utilized the command 
in an attempt to cultivate stronger bilateral and security cooperation ties with African 
states. AFRICOM’s prominence in U.S. foreign policy grew through its involvement in 
executing the Libyan intervention in 2011 and Malian intervention in 2013, and its 
expanding role in combating the spread of violent extremism in West Africa. In terms of 
the impact on U.S. relations, LeVan (2010) notes that reactions to the announcement of 
the command in Kenya, South Africa, and Botswana, among others, expressed serious 
concerns that the increased U.S. military presence would result in increased terrorist 
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attacks in the region, and erode the sovereignty of African states. Some of the continents 
regional organizations also quickly developed unified positions against AFRICOM. For 
example, the fourteen country South African Development Community (SADC) issued a 
statement which stated that, “sister countries of the region should not agree to host 
AFRICOM and in particular, armed forces, since they would have a negative 
effect”(“Notes following International Relations, Peace and Security Cluster media 
briefing,” 2007).  
However, according to a Washington Post investigative article by Whitlock, since 
2007 approximately a dozen air bases, primarily used for surveillance, have been 
established throughout Africa including Burkina Faso, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, and the Seychelles (2012). In addition, a status of forces agreement between the 
U.S. and Niger was signed in January 2013 (Harris & Hirsch, 2013), further expanding 
the network of U.S. surveillance bases throughout the continent. In 2008, despite its 
initially outspoken opposition, South Africa permitted the USS Roosevelt into its waters, 
the first time a U.S. carrier had been allowed to do so since the end of apartheid (Ploch, 
2011). These examples seem to suggest that African governments have gradually become 
more receptive to AFRICOM, and the resources it can leverage for regional security 
challenges. 
How effective is AFRICOM? Harbeson (2011, p. 151) has argued existing 
assessments on AFRICOM are deeply problematic from both an academic and policy 
perspective. He states, 
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“Centrally important in fashioning the terms of partnership with African 
countries will be attention to the distinctive political, socioeconomic, cultural, and 
geographical contours of each country and those of the regions of which they are 
a part…These general characteristics of most Sub-Saharan African countries 
coalesce to shape country-specific contours that must be recognized and 
addressed if US foreign policy in general, and AFRICOM involvement in 
particular, is to be effective…Moreover, it will become apparent that proper 
characterization of these factors and their interface to establish country-specific 
contours entails some wrestling with conceptual issues as well as empirical fact 
gathering to an extent beyond what is often recognized in the literature at best 
implicitly, if at all”. 
 
A 2010 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) review made a similar 
critique of AFRICOM’s own efforts to assess its impact, noting that “AFRICOM is 
generally not measuring long-term effects of activities” and argued that, “without 
assessing activities, AFRICOM lacks information to evaluate their effectiveness, make 
informed future planning decisions, and allocate resources”(Government Accountability 
Office, 2010, p. 2). The same review found that AFRICOM, due to personnel and 
structural issues, lacked institutional knowledge of African states.  
 
Approach 
 The objective of this research is to add to existing evaluations of AFRICOM by 
taking a narrow, in-depth look at its impact. As one of the most significant contemporary 
iterations in U.S. Africa policy, evaluations of AFRICOM’s impact will be critical to 
ensuring U.S. policy towards Africa is responsive to regional dynamics and challenges. 
By evaluating the command in one country, a case study affords a more comprehensive 
picture of the command and its impact.  
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Tanzania was chosen as the case to examine the role of AFRICOM for several 
important reasons. First, it is currently not involved in a military campaign either at home 
or abroad that could potentially skew any findings on AFRICOM’s involvement with the 
country. Second, Tanzania is a U.S. ally but not one of the U.S.’s first-tier priority 
countries in Africa. This affords an opportunity to assess how AFRICOM is engaging 
with African states that are not of immediate strategic concern but are, nonetheless, U.S. 
allies and important regional actors. With an allied state it is easier to identify points of 
long-standing mutual interest and cooperation, points of friction in the bilateral relations, 
and changes, either positive or negative, in the bilateral relationship. Together these 
aspects establish a richer foundation from which to evaluate AFRICOM’s impact.  
Tanzania’s long-standing stability, history of mediating regional conflicts, hosting 
large refugee populations, contributions to peacekeeping missions, and hosting of 
regional and international organization such as the East African Community (EAC) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), make it an important actor in the 
often volatile East Africa region. Tanzania is also challenged by many of the 
transnational threats its neighbors face including illicit narcotic trafficking, piracy, and 
terrorism. As one of the world’s poorest countries, economic development has failed to 
reach the majority of Tanzanians who also suffer from the effects of poor health and 
education systems, as well as the world’s 12th highest HIV/AIDS infection rate, leading 
to pervasive and chronic threats to human security. A strategic U.S.-Tanzanian 
relationship is critical for countering the threats Tanzania faces, and bolstering the 
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country’s capacity to continue its role in addressing ongoing regional conflicts and 
humanitarian crises.  
Historically, the U.S. did not have strong bilateral ties to Tanzania while China, 
Cuba, and Russia had strong diplomatic ties and a heavy presence in the country. Indeed, 
the strength of Tanzania’s ties to these countries, and its historic role as a non-aligned and 
socialist state have often placed it at odds with the U.S., with especially negative impacts 
on U.S. Tanzanian military relations (Meredith, 2011). Despite these historic strains, 
security cooperation with Tanzania has become an important aspect of contemporary 
bilateral relations. U.S. interest in this arena stems from the 1998 terrorist bombing of the 
U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam, the discovery of several Tanzanians being members of 
Al-Qaeda, and the growth of Al-Shabaab and its capabilities in nearby Somalia and 
Kenya (Dagne, 2010). 
U.S. officials regularly cite Tanzania as an example of a positively developing 
country, one that demonstrates good democratic governance and respect for human 
rights. Though security cooperation and assistance have increased, humanitarian and 
economic development support and assistance constitute the cornerstone of contemporary 
U.S.-Tanzanian relations. According to the OECD, using 2010-11 data, the U.S. tops the 
list of donors of gross official development assistance (ODA) to Tanzania (“Tanzania,” 
2013). Total U.S. assistance has steadily increased in recent years, from $370.2 million in 
FY 2008 to $571.892 million in FY 2012 request (Dagne, 2010).  
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Tanzania is one of fifteen focus countries in the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It was granted $1.76 billion FY 2009 to FY 2011, making it the 
largest recipient of the program (“Partnership to Fight HIV/AIDS in Tanzania”). In 
February 2008 the country was granted the largest Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) compact to date, worth $698 million, which sought “…to reduce poverty and 
stimulate economic growth by increasing household incomes through targeted 
investments in transportation, energy, and water”(“Tanzania Compact”). In 2010 
Tanzania was named one of twenty countries in the U.S. Feed the Future (FtF) Initiative, 
administered by USAID. Feed the Future is the U.S. government’s global hunger and 
food security program whose primary objectives are “…accelerating inclusive agriculture 
sector growth and improving nutritional status in specific countries” (Ho & Hanrahan, 
2011). Feed the Future seeks to achieve its objectives in Tanzania by the year 2015.  
This study seeks to answer three questions: What is the impact of AFRICOM on 
executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has AFRICOM 
addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public perception 
about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?  
To get the Tanzanian perspective, the best way to answer these research questions 
would be to interview high-level military, diplomatic, and development officials from the 
Tanzanian government. The purpose of these interviews would be to gather views on 
AFRICOM and its impact on security in Tanzania and U.S.-Tanzanian relations, from a 
Tanzanian viewpoint. The best way to gauge the Tanzanian public’s perception of the 
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command would be to conduct extensive survey work throughout the country, combining 
those findings with a comprehensive content analysis of all the country’s newspapers. 
Similarly, talking to numerous U.S. officials from AFRICOM and the interagency 
organizations that work with the command in Tanzania would be the best way to 
establish a well-rounded perspective of AFRICOM, from a U.S. vantage point. Talking to 
officials from both countries, and across these sectors, would provide information critical 
to answering the research questions pertaining to AFRICOM’s execution of U.S. national 
security policy, and any impacts on human security.  
While these methods would constitute the ideal research design, some 
compromises had to be made to this project’s methodology due to issues of access to 
information and personnel. This evaluation employs a qualitative mixed methods case 
study methodology, and consisted of field research, content analysis of a sample of 
Tanzanian newspapers and a Tanzanian internet discussion forum, and interviews with 
U.S. personnel. In general, issues pertaining to security and defense are less publicly 
available in Tanzania than in the U.S., and personnel in these sectors are difficult to 
access.
1
 Research by Tanzanian academics on this and related topics is also lacking, due 
to the more restricted nature of research on security issues in the country, further 
compounding the difficulty of constructing a Tanzanian perspective on AFRICOM and 
                                                 
1
 Several attempts were made to contact Tanzanian officials working on issues related to 
this research project, as well as a couple of Tanzanian journalists who write on issues of 
security in Tanzania, in an effort to discuss this research project with Tanzanians. None 
of these requests were granted. One official gave an initial response asking what country 
the author was from, when told the author was from the United States the official cut off 
all contact.  
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its impacts. As a result of these limitations, this research had to rely on interviews with 
U.S. officials, publicly available information in the U.S. on what activities AFRICOM is 
undertaking in Tanzania, and that country’s top newspapers and online discussion forum 
to assess public opinion, and the dynamics of the media’s role in shaping public opinion.  
The research for this study was conducted in Tanzania from September 2012 until 
June 2013. The fieldwork included four parts: intensive language instruction, educational 
coursework on Tanzanian news media, interviews, and living with a native Swahili 
speaking host family. Field research is defined by Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 257) 
as “the study of people acting in the natural course of their daily lives. The fieldworker 
ventures into the worlds of others to learn firsthand about how they live, how they talk 
and behave, and what captivates and distresses them.” Learning Swahili served as a 
critical field research component. While Tanzanians learn English in school, the vast 
majority of the population does not possess the requisite proficiency to discuss political 
topics easily. And as a whole, Tanzanians were willing and eager to engage in in-depth 
discussions about their country. Another advantage of becoming proficient in Swahili 
was the ability to listen to conversations between Tanzanians, an unobtrusive means to 
gather attitudinal information and viewpoints.  
Similar to the field research, Swahili language knowledge and proficiency was 
vital to accurately conducting this project’s content analysis component. The Swahili 
language is highly contextual. Often words have several meanings and many words, if 
literally translated, do not connote the same meaning or inference in English as in 
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Swahili. Indeed, although an entire paragraph may seemingly be neutral, the use of a 
particular form of the word “why?” makes the connotation negative. In addition, Swahili 
has a very large and constantly evolving slang vocabulary, which even Tanzanians have 
trouble keeping up with. Advanced language skills and extended time living in Tanzania 
mitigated these complex translation issues and enabled the content analysis to accurately 
assess and code using attitudinal metrics.  
Functioning as a participant-as-observer, field research for this project consisted 
of observing the everyday lives of Tanzanians, including living with a Tanzanian family, 
and engaging with Tanzanians. Field research gave this analysis an understanding of the 
daily lives of Tanzanians; including what political, economic, and social issues are of 
greatest concern, what role they want their government to play, how do they acquire news 
and information, and how they view the U.S. Currently, Tanzanian’s are deeply 
concerned about the political rights of Christians vis a vis Muslims, equal economic 
development, and Tanzania’s status in the East African region. At present there is also a 
distinct sense, within the country, that Tanzania is at a crossroads. Many feel that it is 
ready for a developmental take-off. Others believe that the country’s potential will be 
stunted by a system which, they believe, only serves the needs of the elite. Overall, a 
local perspective was adapted into and influenced this research; specifically the daily and 
broader security concerns of the average Tanzanian.  
A second level of analysis was the Tanzanian media. The approximately 350 
currently registered newspapers are a central source of information for Tanzanians. Many 
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stores display the most popular newspapers each day and groups of people stand outside 
the store throughout the day, reading and discussing the news. Given that newspapers 
play an important role in shaping public opinion, this research utilizes a content analysis 
of Tanzanian English and Swahili language newspapers and an internet news discussion 
forum. According to Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 296), content analysis is “any 
technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified 
characteristics of messages”.  
This analysis followed the application of content analysis, as described by 
Nachmias and Nachmias (2008), by describing the attributes of the content, make 
inferences regarding Tanzanian public opinion of the command, and the influence the 
contents of these newspapers have on public opinion. This content analysis employed a 
theme unit of analysis, qualitatively coding content as either thematically “positive,” 
“negative,” or “neutral.” The method of recording for the content analysis was a 
frequency system, according to Nachmias and Nachmias (2008, p. 299), this is a system 
in which “every occurrence of a given attribute is recorded”. Content analysis was useful 
for the purposes of this research because it allows for a large sample size, with minimal 
intrusiveness. Through content analysis, this research sought to construct opinions of the 
command throughout the wider Tanzanian public by gathering what information about 
AFRICOM is available in the Tanzanian print media, how that information is presented 
(are there any biases), and through content analysis of an online discussion forum.  
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Although The Daily News is a leading newspaper and owned by the Tanzanian 
government, the majority of the country’s newspapers are private. While there are not 
explicit constraints on the freedom of the press and the media is not controlled by the 
Tanzanian government, the law stipulates that there is freedom of the press to the extent 
deemed necessary for the public good (“Tanzania: Freedom of the Press,” 2012). The 
wording of the law makes it possible for the Tanzania government to act with wide 
discretion in terms of what it considers “public good.” In recent year’s media watchdog 
organizations have become concerned about growing intimidation and violence against 
journalists. A Reporters without Borders World Press Freedom Index (2013) cited 
Tanzania as undergoing one of the biggest declines for the year 2012, falling thirty-six 
places from the prior year’s index. An August, 2013 report by the Committee to Protect 
Journalists cited, “…a notable jump over historical trends…”(Rhodes, p. 3) in anti-press 
threats and attacks. The report continues by citing several prominent journalists and 
editors who stated that, due to personal safety concerns and fear of a publication being 
shut down by the government, self-censorship was widespread in the Tanzanian press. 
Freedom House (2012) corroborates these findings, citing many Tanzanian journalists 
admitting to self-censoring because of ongoing arrests, threats, and assaults of journalists.  
Though the media is not controlled by the Tanzanian government, current laws 
still allow the authorities broad discretion to restrict media for reasons of national 
security or public interests (“Tanzania: Freedom of the Press,” 2012). As a result of the 
loosely regulated, often capricious, and retaliatory application of the country’s press and 
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freedom of speech laws, security issues are, largely, not a matter of public knowledge or 
debate. These factors make it difficult to assess the country’s security issues and policies. 
The widespread exclusion of security issues from the news and public discourse also 
makes it difficult to assess public opinion on the issues related to this research topic.  
Despite these issues, an examination of local newspapers from private and 
government sources, and in different languages, lends important insights into existing 
publically available information and the dynamics of how Tanzanian newspapers both 
reflect and shape public opinion of AFRICOM.  To provide a wider scope and construct a 
more comprehensive picture of public opinion, a content analysis was also done of the 
online discussion forum Jamii Forum. Though the Tanzanian government exerts some 
control over the country’s news media, internet discussion forums grant Tanzanians a 
greater freedom from government curtailment of media and free speech, and allow a 
broader segment of the population to voice their opinions.  
Focused interviews were conducted with three current and former high-level U.S. 
officials, including two former Ambassador’s to East African states and a current 
AFRICOM employee. Interviews consisted of one in-person interview, a phone 
interviews, and one in which the respondent answered to the questions through email. 
The interviews consisted of the following questions: How does Tanzania figure in the 
U.S. strategic vision of the East African region? What are the challenges and what are the 
advantages of operating in Tanzania? How, if at all, do AFRICOM’s activities in 
Tanzania differ from other states in the region? Have Tanzanians articulated any concerns 
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about AFRICOM? If so, what concerns? Using a broad definition, what issues does the 
U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in Tanzania? Do you feel AFRICOM 
had enhanced, hindered, or had no impact on U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations?  
Responses served to answer the three central research questions in several ways. 
By comparing information on AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania and interview 
responses on what the U.S. views as the most pressing security issues in Tanzania, how 
the country aligns in the U.S. strategic vision of the East Africa region, and what impact 
has the command had on bilateral relations etc. it is possible to answer the questions: 
what is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? 
and how and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human 
insecurity?  
If the command’s in-country activities and the responses to those questions do not 
align, then there is a mismatch in the execution of U.S. national security policy in 
Tanzania. If they align, the reverse is true. Moreover, responses to these questions help 
illustrate whether or not human security issues constitute a core concern of AFRICOM.  
Field research and content analysis were the primary means to answer the question; does 
AFRICOM foster a positive public perception within Tanzania? Nonetheless, responses 
to the questions about Tanzanians expressing concerns about AFRICOM and what type 
of impact the command has had on bilateral relations, add further insight and are 
indicative of to what extent U.S. and Tanzanian officials are cognizant of wider 
Tanzanian public opinion. Though interviewees had diverse experiences and knowledge 
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regarding AFRICOM and this specific bi-lateral relationship, their interview responses 
were most relevant to, and predominantly used for, the analysis in chapters three and 
four. To encourage openness interviewees were granted anonymity. These interviews 
proved to be vital supplements to the lack of literature on U.S. Tanzanian relations and 
Tanzanian security issues.  
 
Summary 
Through a mixed qualitative methods approach, this analysis was able to develop 
a well-rounded picture of AFRICOM in Tanzania, gaining a strong sense of the nature of 
the command’s in-country activities and the Tanzanian public’s perceptions of the 
command. Field research, enhanced by local language skills, took this research beyond 
secondary sources and shaped an empathetic and in-depth knowledge of the security 
challenges Tanzanians and their country face. A comparison of secondary-source 
information and field research observations with interview responses helped identify 
continuity and inconsistencies in U.S. policies and in-country activities. These methods 
also helped to illustrate whether U.S. policies and activities were congruent with the 
security threats Tanzania faces. A mixed qualitative methods approach strengthened this 
research, providing a multi-faceted and in-depth look at the security challenges in a single 
African state, accessing the extent to which AFRICOM addresses those challenges, and 
measuring if the command is positively impacting U.S. bilateral relations by fostering 
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good public perceptions. Through the use of these methods, this analysis contributes 
depth and specificity to the literature on AFRICOM. 
The following chapters cover these topics: U.S. Combatant Commands and the 
creation of AFRICOM, a review of the policy perspectives on AFRICOM, and the most 
salient traditional and human security challenges in Tanzania. Chapter three assesses 
AFRICOM’s impact from the U.S. perspective. Chapter four presents the Tanzanian 
perspective of AFRICOM’s impact, primarily through an analysis of Tanzanian public 
opinion on AFRICOM. Chapter five draws together the main findings and conclusions of 





























 The purpose of this chapter is to describe (1) U.S. combatant commands: the 
impetus for their creation, their functions, and their place within the U.S. military chain 
of command, including the creation of AFRICOM to illustrate the role combatant 
commands play in U.S. national security policy; (2) the policy perspectives and debates 
surrounding the purpose and creation of AFRICOM; and (3) U.S.-Tanzanian relations, 
with a focus on the history of diplomatic and military relations.  
 
U.S. Combatant Commands  
Department of Defense Unified Geographic Commands, more commonly known 
as combatant commands, form an integral part of the U.S. national security 
establishment. Following the experience of fighting in World War II, and as America 
prepared to confront the Soviet Union in possibly another multi-theater war, an “Outline 
Command Plan” was developed in 1946 (Hodge, 2011). The 1946 command plan 
established seven commands: Pacific, Far East, Northeast, Alaskan, Caribbean, 
European, and the Atlantic Fleet (Hodge, 2011). The development of the command plan 
was a continuation of efforts which began during World War II to achieve better planning 
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and coordination throughout the military. The unified combatant command system was 
an acknowledgement that the U.S. now had interests, responsibilities, and power that 
spanned the globe, requiring its armed forces to have standing tasks (Watson). The 
command plan proposed dividing the world into various geographic areas of 
responsibility (AOR) for the U.S. military, which would each be overseen by a unified 
command. Each command would be responsible for protecting U.S. interests and 
executing U.S. military activities in its respective AOR.  
The establishment of combatant commands was officially authorized through the 
1947 National Security Act under Title X of the U.S. Code, Section161 through Section 
168. The critical aspects of the code state (a) Unified and Specified Combatant 
commands. With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall (1) establish unified combatant 
commands and specified combatant commands to perform military missions; and (2) 
prescribe the force structure of those commands.(Watson, 2011, p. 3) According to 
Watson (2011, p.13) this system of unified commands are defined as each having (1) 
forces from at least two military services (2) a continuing, broad mission, and (3) either a 
functional or geographic responsibility. 
Each command is overseen by a four star Admiral or General who is known as a 
Combatant Commander. As part of the U.S. military chain of command, Combatant 
Commanders report to the President and Secretary of Defense and receive extensive 
oversight from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Though the Chairman of the 
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Joint Chiefs of Staff has no command authority over the Combatant Commanders, it 
plays an important oversight and intra-bureaucracy communication role. According to 
U.S. Code X section 163 the Chairman shall (a) confer with and obtain information from 
the commanders of the combatant commands with respect to the requirements of their 
commands; (b) evaluate and integrate such information; (c) advise and make 
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the requirements of the 
combatant commands, individually and collectively; and (d) communicate, as 
appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to other elements of the 
Department of Defense (Watson, 2011). 
The Unified Command Plan and the delineation of the respective AOR’s are 
regularly reviewed and updated. Over time the commands in the Unified Command Plan 
have changed, been absorbed into other commands, or had their respective AOR’s 
changed according to U.S. security concerns, and shifts in the international strategic 
landscape.  Nonetheless, the geographic approach has remained the primary means by 
which their respective AOR’s have been established. The main mission of commands is 
to embody and execute U.S. military policy, domestically and abroad, along with the 
operational instruction and command and control of U.S. armed forces (Feickert, 2013). 
Combatant commands, therefore, play a central role in U.S. foreign policy.  
 Today’s Unified Command Plan is comprised of nine total commands. Six 
commands are geographic: U.S. Africa Command(USAFRICOM), U.S. Central 
Command(USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command(USEUCOM), U.S. Northern 
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Command(USNORTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command(USPACOM), U.S. Southern 
Command(USSOUTHCOM) The remaining three are functional commands: U.S. Special 
Operations Command(USSOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM), and 
U.S. Transportation Command(USTRANSCOM) (Watson, 2011). 
 Combatant commands follow what is known as a Joint Staff structure, which 
consists of the following “J-codes”: J-1 Directorate of Manpower and Personnel,J-2 
Directorate of Intelligence, J-3 Directorate of Operations,J-4 Directorate of Logistics,J-5 
Directorate of Strategic Plans and Policy,J-6 Directorate of Command, Control, 
Communication, and Computer; J-7 Directorate of Operational Planning and Joint Force 
Development,J-8 Directorate of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, and J-9 
Directorate of Interagency Partnering (Feickert, 2013). Although there are some 
variations across commands to accommodate unique missions in their AOR’s. 
AFRICOM’s creation in 2007 was in response to complex security environments, 
which analysts and policymakers believed required a more thoroughly institutionalized 
joint, whole of government approach. Stemming from the experience of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, this view posited that interagency cooperation and interoperability 
would foster greater security, governance capacity, development and overall human 
security. The nature of the security environment in Africa lent itself to the development 
and application of this post-September 11
th
 security paradigm. AFRICOM’s whole of 
government modus operandi centered on cooperation and support to the efforts of the 
State Department and USAID throughout Africa. This would, it was argued, create 
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stronger strategic relationships between the U.S. and African states and serve U.S. 
national security interests by ameliorating threats to human security and the underlying 
conditions from which traditional security threats developed. If AFRICOM succeeded in 
these efforts it would be a significant evolution in U.S. military engagement abroad, one 
“…mindful of the complicated, interconnected relationships among security, governance, 
and development”(Berschinski, 2007, p. 1).  
A structural deviation, a first for the U.S. military, and presented as a 
representation of how AFRICOM would truly be an interagency command, was the 
designation of the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) as a 
civilian position, a post equivalent to that of a deputy commander (Ploch, 2011). Other 
career senior diplomats from State and USAID were slated to fill the positions of director 
of outreach, senior development advisor, and director of programs for USAID (Buss et 
al., 2011). Planners cited the designation of these positions for civilians as indicative that 
the Command’s staff would be a model of the joint interagency approach. The 
Department of Defense envisioned upwards of a quarter of AFRICOM’s total staff, 
roughly 125 billets, would be from other government agencies (Bachmann, 2010). The 
novelty of AFRICOM would be the inclusion of interagency personnel throughout the 
command. It was argued that integrating State and USAID personnel into all levels of the 
command, as opposed to just placing all interagency personnel in the J-9 like other 
commands, would help AFRICOM plan and coordinate activities which achieved the 
objectives of all three organizations, comprehensively addressing the root causes of 
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conflict and instability. This approach was considered the hallmark of AFRICOM, what 
differentiated it from other regional combatant commands, and a forward looking model 
for combatant commands.  
 
AFRICOM’s Strategic Objectives and Mission Statement 
Two further points of analysis are the command’s strategic objectives and mission 
statement. Table 2.1 contains AFRICOM’s strategic objective for 2008-2013 




 AFRICOM's theater strategy will support broader national efforts, in 
coordination with other USG agencies, to: 
 Confront transnational threats to security 
 Counter the threats posed by WMD's, illegal arms, and narcotics 
 Mitigate violent conflicts 
 Promote Stability, Security, and Reconstruction efforts 
 Turn the tide on HIV/AIDS and Malaria 
 Strengthen democratic principles by fostering respect for the Rule of Law, civilian 
control of the military, and budget transparency; 
 Foster the conditions that lead to a peaceful, stable, and economically strong Africa 
 Ultimately, AFRICOM will focus its effort on promoting the following theater 
objectives: 
 African countries and organizations can provide for their own security and 
contribute to security on the continent 
 African governments and regional security organizations possess the capability to 
mitigate the threat of violent extremism 
 African countries maintain professional militaries responsive to civilian authorities 
and that respect the Rule of Law and international human rights norms. 
 
2009 
 Defeat the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and its associated networks 
 Ensure peace operation capacity exists to respond to emerging crises, and 
continental peace support operations are effectively fulfilling mission requirements. 
 Cooperate with identified African states in the creation of an environment 
inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of WMD capabilities 
and expertise 
 Improve security sector governance and increased stability through military support 
to comprehensive, holistic, and enduring USG efforts in designated states; 





 The primary purposes of our activities can be categorized as follows 
 Building the capacity of partner conventional forces 
 Supporting capacity building of partner security forces 
 Building the capacity of partner enabling forces 
 Fostering strong strategic relationships 
 Conducting defense sector reform 
 Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability 
 Countering transnational and extremist threats 
 Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict 
 Addressing conditions that contribute to instability 
 
2011 
 Ensure that the al-Qaida networks and associated violent extremists do not attack 
the United States 
 Maintain assured access and freedom of movement throughout our AOR 
 Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the will, capability, 
and capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit 
trafficking of weapons, people and narcotics 
 Assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to 
execute effective continental peace operations and to respond to crises 
 Encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of 
law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their 
respective states 
2012  Countering terrorism and Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) 
 Countering Piracy and Illicit Trafficking 
 Partnering to Strengthen Defense Capabilities 
 Preparing and Responding to Crisis 
 Fiscal Responsibility 
2013  Countering Violent Extremist Organizations 
 Strengthening maritime security and countering illicit trafficking 
 Strengthening defense capabilities 
 Maintaining strategic posture 
 Preparing for and responding to crises 
 
Source: (Ham, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013; Ward, 2008, 2009, 2010) 
 
From the table it is evident that the command’s strategic objectives have 
undergone significant changes, with the scope of AFRICOM’s objectives being 
progressively narrowed over time. The 2008 posture statement heavily emphasized 
interagency cooperation and a broad set of strategic objectives, including post conflict 
reconstruction and efforts to address human security issues. By 2009 the scope of 
AFRICOM’s objectives had already narrowed. Support to reconstruction efforts was 
removed and, in general, the strategic objectives had a more military focus. 2010’s 
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strategic objectives seemingly attempted to bridge the gap between 2008 and 2009. 
Although the agenda was slightly expanded from 2009, for the first time interagency 
cooperation was not mentioned. Traditional security threats were the dominant focus in 
2011, although they retained some breadth in terms of describing how the command 
would work to achieve its objectives. The strategic objectives for 2012-13 were further 
narrowed, placing a clear emphasis on traditional and international security issues.  It is 
important to note that since 2009, interagency cooperation has not been a strategic 
objective for AFRICOM. 
Another area of relevance is the command’s mission statement. The mission 
statement for AFRICOM helps to guide the command’s activities, and like the strategic 
objectives in the posture statements, set parameters for its activities. AFRICOM’s 
mission statement has undergone several iterations since the formation of the command 
in 2007. The draft statement read, 
“U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National  Security objectives by working 
with African states  and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and 
security in the AOR. U.S. Africa Commandleads the in-theatre DOD response to 
support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and 
strategies. In concert with other U.S. government agencies and other international 
partners, U.S. Africa Commandconducts theater security cooperation activities to 
assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As 
directed, U.S. Africa Commandconducts military operations to deter aggression 
and and respond to crises.” (“U.S. Africa Command,” 2007, p. 7)  
 
In contrast, the 2012-present statement reads,  
“United States Africa Command protects and defends the national security 
interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African 
states and regional organizations and, when directed, conducts military 
operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a 
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security environment conducive to good governance and development.” (Ham, 
2013, p. 2) 
 
Similar to the commands strategic objectives, over time the mission statement has 
undergone substantial evolutions. Like the early posture statements in 2008-09 the draft 
mission statement places significant emphasis on an interagency approach but lacks 
specificity regarding what activities would be undertaken by AFRICOM. The 2011 
mission statement, as was the case with the strategic objectives that year, completely 
departs from an interagency approach and instead focuses heavily on military activities. 
Indeed, the draft statement and the 2011 statement illustrate a dramatic swing in the 
conceptualization of how AFRICOM would function.  
It is apparent that by 2011 AFRICOM had evolved into a more traditional 
combatant command, in terms of its mission and strategic objectives. The changes in the 
command’s strategic objectives and mission statements together with details of 
AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania reveal that the command’s activities and objectives 
lack the whole of government approach envisioned when AFRICOM was established, 
and in its initial operating phases. For some observers these changes in AFRICOM’s 
mission statement and strategic objectives has reaffirmed their skepticism of the 
command’s intentions and capabilities and, in particular, its whole of government 
approach. Steve McDonald (2011) has charged that AFRICOM has been a “chameleon” 




Policy Perspectives on AFRICOM 
Following the announcement of AFRICOM’s creation, some analysts and 
observers feared U.S. Africa policy was undergoing militarization and its development 
and diplomatic efforts and the region were being securitized (Nathan, 2009). Critics also 
contended an increased U.S. military presence would exacerbate security threats, namely 
terrorism, by furnishing more targets for anti-American terrorist groups from around the 
world
 
(Buss et al., 2011). Proponents (Isike, Uzodike, & Gilbert, 2008; Pham, 2007a) 
viewed the creation of AFRICOM as a positive development for U.S. Africa policy, 
arguing that AFRICOM corrected a long-standing problem in DoD’s bureaucratic 
organization, and enabled the U.S. to give a more consistent focus to the region and foster 
better relations. Together, these policy perspectives raise serious questions regarding the 
role of the U.S. military in Africa, the balance amongst America’s diplomacy, 
development, and defense capabilities, and the meaning of security in Africa.  
To date these two perspectives dominate the literature on AFRICOM. Two works 
of note in the literature are the edited volumes African Security and the African 
Command: Viewpoints on the U.S. Role in Africa (Buss et al., 2011) and U.S. Strategy in 
Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges (Francis, 2010). These volumes 
include both the aforementioned positive and negative arguments about the command.  
Another widely used source is Robert G. Berschinski’s (2007) AFRICOM’s Dilemma: 
“The Global War on Terrorism”, “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the 
Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa. This nuanced and balanced assessment includes 
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many prescient views on the potential problems AFRICOM would face if more 
traditional hard power security operations overshadowed its soft power work. Berschinski 
also contributes valuable process and policy recommendations regarding the command’s 
focus on terrorism in Africa. Another scholar of note is J. Peter Pham who has written 
extensively about AFRICOM, noting that the command brings greater U.S. resources and 
focus to Africa. The arguments and analysis in these works constitute much of the 
following outline of the merits and detractions of AFRICOM.  
One of the two dominant perspectives in the literature is that AFRICOM is a 
necessary bureaucratic reorganization, and a new vision for addressing Africa’s and 21st 
century security challenges. The other major point of contention this perspective holds, is 
that AFRICOM represents a positive development because it reflects a recognition within 
the U.S. government of Africa’s growing strategic significance; something that has been 
long neglected. This view posits this recognition is important for U.S Africa policy; 
positively influencing U.S. African cooperation, while also enhancing the capacity of 
African states to address regional security issues.  
Amongst those who support the establishment of AFRICOM is J. Peter Pham 
(2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2008).  According to Pham “…AFRICOM’s existence is the 
recognition that the United States does have significant national interests in Africa…” 
and AFRICOM will enable more sustained regional engagement; critical for both U.S. 
strategic interests and effectively addressing African security challenges (Buss et al., 
2011, p. 58). For Pham (2008) and other proponents, AFRICOM is not the militarization 
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of development and diplomacy or the re-appropriation of those aspects of U.S. foreign 
policy to the Defense Department. Rather AFRICOM steps away from the military’s 
traditional way of reacting to threats and instead focuses on conflict prevention, or phase 
0 operations, creating a security environment in which development can take place. 
Others have supported this view and argued that, “…AFRICOM could serve as an 
instrument to create a truly secure African environment where development can thrive” 
(Isike et al., 2008, p. 32). In short, for proponents AFRICOM both utilizes and 
institutionalizes the lessons learned from U.S. state building efforts since the end of the 
Cold War, and is the manifestation of the security-development nexus approach in policy 
practice (Pham, 2010). 
The vast majority of the programs which AFRICOM assumed responsibility for 
were already existing security cooperation programs, previously conducted through 
CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM (“U.S. Africa Command,” 2007, p. 5). Pham (2010, 
2011) notes that AFRICOM is therefore more of a continuation of U.S. Africa policy than 
is widely acknowledged, challenging the claim of opponents that AFRICOM represents 
the sudden and radical militarization of U.S.-Africa relations. Pham also argues the 
creation of AFRICOM addressed the  bureaucratic gaps in U.S.-Africa policy by 
replacing “…an antiquated structural framework inherited from times when the continent 
was barely factored into the United States’ strategic calculus”(Buss et al., 2011, p. 62).   
Overall, proponents of AFRICOM highlight the fact that the command affords the 
region significantly more attention, than it had under the prior configuration, when it was 
 32 
 
divided between three commands. They argue this division discouraged developing and 
institutionalizing expertise on Africa and resulted in policy seams, negatively impacting 
the development of relations with African states and regional organizations. Among those 
who share this view are Herbst and Mills (2007), who posit AFRICOM will sharpen 
DoD’s focus on Africa and encourage and institutionalize expertise about Africa.  Berouk 
Mesfin (2009) of the Institute for Security Studies adds that a more in-depth knowledge 
of Africa will lead to better informed planning for the U.S. military, and advice in the 
event of crises. In addition to redressing this long-standing bureaucratic gap, proponents 
claim that AFRICOM will be better able to coordinate U.S. Africa policy between 
Defense, State, and USAID. This is critical for the effectiveness of their respective 
mandates in Africa, as well as the complexity of the security environment in African 
states (Forest & Crispin, 2009).  
Proponents generally acknowledge that there were problems with the way 
AFRICOM was announced and initially planned, but often argue that adjustments in U.S. 
public relations regarding AFRICOM, and after seeing the command in action, African 
apprehensions and objections to the command have been significantly allayed. Opponents 
are not as convinced, viewing lingering skepticism and opposition as being 
fundamentally about deeply-seeded African opposition to any form of imperialism, which 
they view as epitomized by the creation of AFRICOM (Fah, 2010; Nathan, 2009; Otieno, 
2010). A Carl LeVan (2010) has put forth an alternative hypothesis to the pervasive view 
that AFRICOM’s announcement, roll-out, and subsequent African opposition were the 
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result of a public relations blunder. LeVan’s research gives compelling evidence that 
opposition or support of AFRICOM was based on African states foreign aid dependence, 
specifically aid from the U.S. LeVan found those states with lower aid dependence being 
more critical of AFRICOM, and hypothesized these states had more freedom to criticize 
U.S. policy since they were less dependent on U.S. foreign aid. 
The literature in opposition to AFRICOM centers on the view that the command 
represents a militarization of U.S Africa policy, and a securitization of development and 
diplomacy. This opposition has been succinctly summarized by Isike, Uzodike, and 
Gilbert(2008, p. 34) as constituting the following,  
“A significant step towards a US-driven militarisation and destabilisation 
of an already conflict-prone continent…there is also concern that AFRICOM 
signals a growing US securitisation of aid and development…the likelihood that 
AFRICOM’s presence might actually undermine the ability of African 
institutions…to address regional problems and challenges from within”. 
 
Tynes (2006, p. 111) argues “Overall, the essential aspects of US foreign policy 
can be characterised as the re-militarising of African states, the initiating of repressive 
legislation, and the presence of military troops and execution of military exercises on the 
African continent.” For opponents, AFRICOM demonstrates a narrow and self-serving 
conception of security, one predominantly focused on terrorism, oil, and countering 
China’s geostrategic ambitions in Africa (Berschinski, 2007). The focus on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism is particularly troubling for some analysts (Keenan, 2010; Tynes, 
2006),  who contend that U.S. counter-terror efforts thwart the process of democratization 
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and the growth of robust civil society in African states. And ultimately undermine the 
process of development critical for stemming security threats in weak states. 
 The opposition viewpoint also posits that AFRICOM’s interagency approach has 
been overwhelmed by the Department of Defense due to its resource superiority vis a vis 
the State Department and USAID. Equally troubling for opponents is the possibility that 
not only could DoD’s resources overwhelm those of State and USAID, but that this will 
undercut existing U.S. economic, governance, education, health care, and humanitarian 
programs in Africa, eroding the soft power aspects of U.S. Africa policy (Piombo, 2012). 
Others, such as Collin Thomas-Jensen (2008), believe AFRICOM could play a positive 
role in U.S. Africa policy, but addressing the shortages in U.S. civilian capacity should be 
done first, in order for civilian agencies to stand on more even footing with DoD as 
interagency representatives in AFRICOM. He argues the absence of comprehensively 
addressing America’s civilian deficiencies, a joint whole of government approach will 
never be fully realized, and a de-facto militarization will occur. 
 In contrast to proponents who assert that AFRICOM seeks to address a broad 
range of security issues, critics charge that AFRICOM fails to recognize that human 
security issues are the most vital in African states. Indeed many have based their 
skepticism of AFRICOM on the belief that U.S. security interests will dominate and 
marginalize the security concerns of African states. As one skeptic argued, “The crucial 
point is not that the US wants to advance its interests, but that these interests do not 
coincide with those of Africa and, more importantly, that the US has the means and the 
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disposition to pursue its interests at the expense of African interests”(Nathan, 2009, p. 
60). That the U.S. planned and announced AFRICOM largely without consulting African 
leaders, is cited as evidence that the command is merely another instrument of the U.S. 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), and  intended to  secure America’s energy, namely oil, 
interests on the continent, and to check China’s rising influence in the region (Ganzle, 
2011). According to Volman (2010) it is disingenuous for U.S. policymakers to suggest 
that AFRICOM was not founded based on the U.S. objectives to fight terrorism, secure 
energy resources, and counter China’s rise on the continent. 
 Gilber, Uzodike, and Isike (2009, p. 277) support this view and argue that if 
human security and development issues were a core concern of the U.S. then the creation 
of a military organization is not a logical option. Rather, “…AFRICOM was unilaterally 
created for the furtherance and consolidation of US strategic state-centric security 
interests but packaged in human security paraphernalia for the twin purposes of 
credibility and acceptability by African statesmen”. Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Ojakorotu 
(2010, p. 99) take this point further and argue that addressing terrorism and its 
connections to state fragility is not, fundamentally, about the security of African states. 
They state, “The main weakness of the argument that connects weak states with global 
terrorism is that the security of Africa itself is not emphasised. What is emphasised is the 
security of the Western and American nations.”  
In short, for the majority of opponents, African security is fundamentally about 
human security. For these opponents U.S. and African security interests cannot converge 
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through the establishment of AFRICOM because it is a military organization. As a 
military organization, AFRICOM signifies a fundamental   “…dissonance between US 
strategic security concerns on the continent and the issues that constitute the African 
security predicament” (Isike et al., 2008, p. 22). Salih (2010, p. 91) urges analysts to 
looks beyond the benefits AFRICOM would bring to the militaries of African states and 
regional organizations, and instead focus on human security stating, “…human rather 
than military security is what would deliver peace and security to Africa”. These analysts 
believe U.S and African security interests can converge, if they are each based on the 
need to enhance human security,  
“…by furthering mutually articulated partnerships aimed at deepening 
democracy and building capacity for good governance as well as increasing aid 
and foreign direct investment, writing off debts, halting environmental 
despoliation and finding a cure for HIV/Aids”(Isike et al., 2008, p. 24). 
 
Tanzanian Security Issues 
Despite chronic poverty, since independence Tanzania has played a leading 
diplomatic and political role in East Africa. In contrast to neighboring Kenya, Tanzania’s 
independence in 1961 from Great Britain was achieved through a largely peaceful 
political process, under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. Since independence Tanzania 
has held the distinction of being generally stable and capable of maintaining an 
impressive degree of social harmony and cohesion, even though it has roughly one 
hundred and twenty-five different ethnic groups (Dagne, 2010). Its stability and 
consistency in following a morally based foreign policy have won respect from the 
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international community and allowed Tanzania to make “…important non-economic 
contributions to the international system out of proportion to its economic 
muscle”(Waters, 2006, p. 46). 
Soon after independence Tanzania assumed an active foreign policy and presence 
in the international community. Nyerere positioned Tanzania as a non-aligned state in 
Cold War politics (CIA, 2011), through his founding role in the non-aligned movement. 
The country was an early and ardent supporter of the anti-apartheid movement and, at the 
expense of its own economic interests, it led an economic boycott against South Africa, 
and offered strong support to other independence movements in the region (Waters, 
2006). Nyerere’s stature as a statesmen and the vision he articulated for Tanzania, and 
Africa as a whole, made Tanzania a central member of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). His leadership was instrumental in developing these dynamics in Tanzania’s 
foreign policy, dynamics which have persisted until today.  
While Nyerere’s principled style of leadership and foreign policy garnered 
international praise and admiration, under his leadership Tanzania suffered disastrous 
economic decline. At the time of independence in 1961 Tanzania was poor, but its 
economic prospects were promising and the country’s leadership decided to continue 
with the capitalist economic model instituted during colonialism (Ngowi, 2009). Between 
1963 and 1983 Tanzania became the “darling” of the international aid community and 
was one of the world’s largest recipients of aid (Edwards, 2012). Central to Tanzania’s 
receipt of international aid was widespread international praise and attention of the 
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honest, idealistic, and humble leadership of Nyerere. Edwards (2012, p. 20) notes that 
admiration for Nyerere and the impact it had on the World Bank’s unquestioning support 
and supply of aid was dubbed “the cult of Tanzaphilia”. 
However Nyerere’s announcement of the Arusha Declaration in February 1967 
had instituted sweeping changes in the country’s economic philosophy and policies. The 
Arusha Declaration stated that Tanzania would pursue an indigenous African socialism 
he termed, ujamaa (Meredith, 2011). Moreover the capitalist, market oriented economic 
model inherited from colonization would be transformed into a centrally planned and 
state owned model (Ngowi, 2009). The Arusha Declaration stemmed from Nyerere’s 
concern that Tanzania’s reliance on foreign aid and perpetuation of a capitalist economic 
system was leading to the erosion of traditional and communal values and incentives for 
promoting development.  
Ultimately the economic policies of the Arusha Declaration proved to be a 
disaster for the country’s economic growth and development. The hostile policies 
towards the private sector, which stemmed from the Arusha Declaration, led to its virtual 
demise, leaving the public sector almost wholly responsible for the country’s economy 
(Ngowi, 2009). The economic consequences were stark. By the end of the 1970’s 
Tanzania’s trade deficit was continually rising. In 1975 the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank had to rescue the government from financial collapse. 
Agriculture, the lynchpin of Tanzania’s economy, dropped by 10% from 1979-1982, and 
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between 1977 and 1982 the national output as a whole declined by one-third, as the 
population’s standard of living dropped by 50% (Meredith, 2011).  
In 1981 Nyerere conceded, “We are poorer now than we were in 1972”(Meredith, 
2011, p. 258). Tanzania’s shocking economic decline represents one of the most dramatic 
declines in a country that has not experienced major war or internal conflict. By 1991 
Tanzania was the second poorest country in the world, dramatically falling from its 
previous position of twenty-five in 1976 (Edwards, 2012). Reluctantly Nyerere 
acknowledged the failure of his economic policies, and began to institute reforms with 
the assistance and support of the IMF and the World Bank. Successive Tanzanian leaders 
have taken steps, although often haltingly, to institute capitalist and market-oriented 
economic reforms and liberalize the economy as a whole (CIA, 2011).  
Although it suffered severe economic decline throughout the 1970’s and ‘80’s 
Tanzania maintained an active foreign policy agenda. In addition to actively supporting 
independence movements in the region and staunchly opposing South Africa’s apartheid 
regime, it played a leading role in attempts to address growing conflict and instability in 
African Great Lakes states and became a safe haven for refugees in the region. In 1978-
79 the country single-handedly repelled an invasion by Uganda’s Idi Amin and, with a 
force of 45,000 troops, ousted his brutal and repressive regime (Meredith, 2011). 
Tanzania’s international reputation was bolstered in the 1990’s when it hosted the 
world’s largest refugee population and played a leading mediation and negotiating role to 
disputes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi. After the 
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Rwandan genocide Arusha, Tanzania was chosen as the location for the UN Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda. Because it has been the site of numerous regional mediation efforts 
the city of Arusha is often called the “Geneva of Africa”(Waters, 2006).  Today Tanzania 
continues to have good relations throughout the region and to demonstrate its 
commitment to regional integration and cooperation. It is the only state which is a 
member of the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Through participation in these organizations Tanzania has worked 
towards regional development, economic and trade cooperation, and security policy 
coordination.  
Participation in the EAC and SADC, combined with a disciplined fiscal policy, 
has yielded stable economic gains that displayed resilience in the midst of the global 
economic downturn. From 2009-2012 the country experienced GDP growth rates 
averaging above 6.5% and is projected to hit growth rates of 7.1% in 2013 (African 
Development Bank Group, 2012). Increased gold mining production, and the recent 
discovery of natural gas deposits that could as much as triple Tanzania’s estimated 
reserves, have led to speculation that Tanzania is poised to become a major regional 
economic force (Sanders & Moseley, 2012).Yet Tanzania’s macroeconomic gains have 
largely failed to change the economic conditions for the majority of the country’s 
population which still has an overall poverty rate of 34%, with the absolute number of 
people classified as poor rising by 1.3 million from 2001-2007 (African Development 
Bank Group, 2012) .  
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 Traditional Security Concerns 
Though it has enjoyed overall internal peace and stability, Tanzania faces 
significant threats to transnational and human security. In terms of transnational security 
threats, Tanzania faces terrorism, piracy, and increasingly pervasive illicit narcotics 
trafficking. The continuation of these security issues will have an increasingly 
destabilizing impact on Tanzania, jeopardizing the country’s stability and development 
gains, with deleterious implications for East African, and U.S. security interests. .  
 
Terrorism 
The 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi turned 
the U.S. government’s attention to the presence and lethality of the terrorist, specifically 
Al-Qaeda, threat in Africa. Following the September 11
th
 attacks the Eastern and Horn of 
Africa regions gained further prominence. Concerns were heightened when Kenya was 
again targeted by terrorists in 2002. Furthermore, the realization of the scope of the threat 
posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its linkage to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
pushed the U.S. to focus a significant portion of U.S. counter-terror policy on the East 
and Horn of Africa regions (Ploch, 2010). 
Kenya has become the U.S.’s dominant partner in its Horn and East Africa 
regional counter-terror strategy. Tanzania has become a tier-two focus country, as the 
U.S. seeks to prevent the spread of terrorism, while simultaneously working to support 
and encourage the country’s economic and political stability (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). 
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The Tanzanian government has, to a great degree, cooperated with U.S. counter-terror 
efforts in the region. The government implemented the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 
2002. In 2006 it passed the Prevention of Money Laundering Act which created new 
banking and anti-corruption laws. The Tanzanian police have created a Counter-terrorism 
Unit, and in 2007 the government established a National Counterterrorism Centre 
(Whitaker, 2010). Tanzania also participates in the East African Counterterrorism 
Initiative (EACTI) through which it has received computers at border entry points, a 
forensics laboratory, and a new laser technology passport system (Whitaker, 2010).  
While Tanzania enhanced its counter-terror efforts, the current extent of the 
terrorist threat in Tanzania is somewhat ambiguous. Since the 1998 bombing of the U.S. 
embassy Tanzania has not experienced another high casualty terrorism incident. The 
1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy was a mutually eye-opening experience for 
Tanzanians. Their long-held sense of security and freedom from the violence in 
neighboring states was sharply questioned. Although the Tanzanian government has 
demonstrated a significant degree of cooperation with counter-terror efforts in the region, 
the absence of terrorism incidents has seemingly, over time, diminished the government’s 
perception of a terrorist threat. Research by Elise Whitaker (2010) has shown the 
Tanzanian government’s lack of implementation and compliance with the provisions of 
various U.S. and international counter terror efforts highlight both the diminished threat 
perception and other domestic political issues. Indeed, during his 2005 presidential 
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campaign and throughout his presidency Kikwete has rarely mentioned the issue of 
terrorism (Whitaker, 2010).  
Nonetheless, the country is still viewed by the U.S. as susceptible and vulnerable 
to terrorism. The U.S. State Department’s 2011 Terrorism Report on Tanzania 
acknowledges that the country has not experienced any major terrorist incidents, but 
continues by saying “Inter-agency representatives of Tanzania’s National 
Counterterrorism Center…still consider diplomatic missions, foreign investment projects, 
and tourist areas targets for terrorist attacks”(United States Department of State, 2012a, p. 
33).  U.S. fears of terrorism in Tanzania are largely due to its geographic proximity to 
states that experience significant terrorist activity, namely Kenya and Somalia, and its 
internal conditions which the U.S. views as conducive to terrorism. These include: porous 
borders, poor security service capacity, corruption, availability of technology and 
weapons, and significant numbers of Western targets. William Rosenau (2005, p. 1)  has 
argued that the pervasive nature of these conditions in Tanzania make it “…ideal for 
conducting terrorist operations”. 
However, field research done by Rosenau (2005) indicates that the adoption of 
Salafist or Wahabbi Islamic ideology has not taken root in a substantial portion of the 
country’s Muslim population which, as a whole, has been resistant to radicalization. 
Although Tanzania’s lack of state capacity is a critical component to terrorist activity and 
recruitment, the population seemingly lacks that political orientation and mobilizing 
ideology necessary for recruitment and participation in terrorist groups.  
 44 
 
While existing research is skeptical about the recruitment capacity for terrorist 
organizations, Rosenau (2005, p. 6) notes that, “ Heavy-handed government attacks on 
Muslim communities, the lack of economic opportunity, and growing political frustration 
may in the future prove to be more fertile material for exploitation by terrorist recruiters”. 
Conversations with Muslims in Zanzibar and the Tanzanian mainland revealed that all of 
the aspects Rosenau highlights as being conducive to recruitment into terrorist 
organizations are acutely felt by Tanzania’s Muslims. Many Muslims, despite the fact 
that the country’s President and most of the top leadership are Muslims, feel they are 
politically excluded and economically disadvantaged vis a vis Christians. At present it 
appears as though there are rising tensions between Muslims and Christians. Indeed the 
February, 2013 assassination of a Catholic priest in Zanzibar, the May, 2013 bombing of 
a Catholic church in Arusha serve as the most recent prominent examples that religious 
tensions are on the rise throughout Tanzania.  
As the preceding analysis revealed, concerns over mainland Tanzania’s links to 
the global jihadist network, potential to become a safe haven, recruiting ground, and 
target for radical Islamic terrorism are tenuous. However the issue of terrorism in 
Zanzibar differs from mainland Tanzania (Ousman, 2004). The threat of terrorism in 
Zanzibar is connected to the broader issue of a growing separatist ideology for separation 
from Tanzania, breaking the union (“muungano” in Swahili) established in 1964, which 
merged Tanganyika with Zanzibar.  
 45 
 
Since the era of German colonialization until today, Zanzibar’s close economic, 
cultural, and ethnic ties to Arab states has led to an isolationism that is both externally 
and self-imposed. There is a deeply entrenched sense and clearly perceptible view 
amongst Zanzibari’s and mainland Tanzanians that the “Arab” Zanzibari’s are separate 
from the “Africans” of mainland Tanzania. The islands inhabitants still maintain strong 
links to Arab states and welcome their investments and influence. Since the 1980’s 
wealthy individual donors from Gulf States have funded mosques, madrassas, health 
clinics, secondary schools, teachers training colleges, and universities in Zanzibar 
(Turner, 2009). Saudi Arabia is also estimated to contribute close to $1 million a year to 
the building of new mosques and madrassas (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). They have also 
funded scholarships for study abroad trips for young Zanzibari men to Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan. Two of the three universities in Zanzibar are Islamic and funded by Kuwaiti and 
Saudi Arabian donors with faculty from Sudan and Pakistan (Turner, 2009). In 1992 
Zanzibar announced that it was joining the Organization of Islamic States (OIS), despite 
the fact that the Tanzanian government was not a member of the organization. The 
resultant uproar over the announcement induced the Zanzibari government to withdraw 
its application (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). The Zanzibar government’s solidarity with Arab 
states, and willingness to counter the political stance of the mainland to do so, is 
indicative of its divergent political views and agenda.  
Any discussion about politics with Zanzibari’s will quickly turn into an 
indictment of mainland Tanzania’s government, and how it intentionally and 
 46 
 
systematically marginalizes Zanzibar politically and economically. Conversations with 
Zanzibari’s also reveal deep-seeded antagonism towards mainland Tanzania, much of 
which stem from Zanzibar’s history as a prosperous slave trading island. It is not 
uncommon to hear Zanzibari’s remark about how they are superior to the “African” 
mainland Tanzanians and to support their claim of superiority by pointing out how they 
once sold the “Africans” as slaves. Zanzibari’s also utilize language as a means to denote 
a separation with the mainland. Despite being a semi-autonomous region Zanzibari’s 
refer to Zanzibar as an “nchi” (“country” in Swahili) and are perturbed if it is pointed out 
to them that, in fact, Zanzibar is not a country but part of Tanzania. One American 
expatriate whom has been living in Zanzibar for over three years remarked to the author 
that the desire of Zanzibari’s to break the “muungano” has dramatically grown since she 
arrived.  
Combined these historical and cultural narratives, language syntax, and views on 
contemporary politics have created a pervasive underlying narrative throughout 
Zanzibar’s population and society. This narrative essentially states; Zanzibar is 
historically and culturally superior so the mainland works to suppresses Zanzibar and its 
economic development. If Zanzibar was free of the mainland it would regain the 
prosperity it enjoyed during the days of the slave trade. The combination of this narrative 
of disenfranchisement, the grievances regarding Zanzibar’s economic development 
status, and the desire to break the union with mainland Tanzania and create strong links 
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with Arab states, form a potentially troubling confluence of factors for future stability and 
security.  
In 2001 a non-governmental Islamic charity organization commonly known as 
UAMSHO (“awakening” in Swahili) was officially registered with the Zanzibar 
government as a non-governmental organization, claiming to advocate for Muslim rights 
and unity (Turner, 2009).  However over the last couple of years the organization has 
progressively evolved into an Islamist political party, and seemingly is seeking to 
cultivate a broader political movement. UAMSHO’s rise as a political force can be 
attributed to the opposition political party Civic United Front (CUF) agreeing to a power 
sharing agreement with the dominant Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and forming a 
Government of National Unity (GNU) following the 2010 general election. The power 
sharing agreement was intended to mitigate the electoral violence that had characterized 
Zanzibar’s elections since the islands first multiparty elections in 1995. Persistent 
electoral violence had reached the point of threatening the island’s political and economic 
stability (Kagaruki, 2013). 
In its new political role UAMSHO has called for the dissolution of the union with 
mainland Tanzania, restrictions on alcohol sales and consumption, the imposition of a 
dress code for foreign tourists, and uses rhetoric which feeds resentments towards 
mainland Tanzanians and the government (“Contagion of discontent; the Swahili coast,” 
2012). As UAMSHO has assumed a more political role increasing violence has been 
associated with the organization. In October 2012 Zanzibar was wracked by the third 
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incident of violent protests connected to UAMSHO in 2012 when three days of violence 
broke out after a leader of UAMSHO went missing. Supporters alleged that he was 
kidnapped and detained by government security forces. Zanzibar’s security forces denied 
that they were at all connected with his disappearance.  
Discussions with Zanzibari’s about UAMSHO reveal there is widespread support 
for the group’s political views, insistence on maintaining the island’s conservative 
culture, and willingness to challenge the government. Although there was distaste for the 
group’s participation in violence, it didn’t appear to diminish support for the group’s 
overall goals and ideology. These events and the support for the group point to 
UAMSHO and the views it espouses as a growing force to be reckoned with in 
Zanzibar’s politics and society, and could ported the use of violent tactics in the future. 
Of particular concern to both the U.S. and Tanzanian governments is the potential 
use of terrorist violence. Zanzibar does have prior connections to terrorist activity. Three 
suspected bombers involved in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam 
and Nairobi were from Zanzibar (Brents & Mshigeni, 2004).  In 2001 a U.S. court 
convicted Khalfan Khamis Mohamed of participating in the attack and Ahmed Khalfan 
Ghailani has been indicted and included on the FBI’s most wanted list (Brents & 
Mshigeni, 2004). There is some controversy over to what extent Zanzibari’s have 
participated in terrorist activity either domestically and internationally post 9-11. After 9-
11 there were some reports that leaflets were being distributed in Mosques throughout 
Zanzibar seeking volunteers to join Al-Qaeda. Zanzibar authorities said they investigated 
 49 
 
locals traveling abroad to see if they had plans to travel to Afghanistan  and they 
reportedly found no Al-Qaeda recruits (Lacey, 2002). These claims by local authorities 
are somewhat dubious given that some Al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen have been identified 
as Zanzibari’s (Vittori & Bremer, 2009).  
At present the evidence does not support that a radical Islamic ideology is 
widespread in Zanzibar. Nonetheless the deeply ingrained sense of marginalization and 
relative deprivation grievances vis a vis mainland Tanzania felt by the majority of 
Zanzibaris, and the growing sentiment of the need to break the union with the Tanzanian 
mainland, provide potential fertile ground for  radical ideology to take root and for the 
use of terrorist tactics to precipitate. Should radical ideologies take root Zanzibar’s status 
as a Western tourist destination would ensure any potential terrorist activity would have 
ample targets and opportunities at its disposal.  
 
Drug Trafficking  
Drug trafficking through Tanzania and the East African region is a newly 
emerged security threat. The United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has noted a 
startling upward trend in the flow of drug trafficking in East Africa, most notably heroin, 
from South and Southeast Asia (UNODC, 2009). An intra-regional trafficking also exists 
among Tanzania, Madagascar, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and the Comoros. Tanzania 
is a vital transit state in these trafficking routes and its population is increasingly 
becoming consumers of these drugs. Tanzania’s geography plays a central role in this 
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problem. As a result of sharing borders with eight other states, a 1,424 kilometer Eastern 
coastline, and highly porous borders, Tanzanian authorities are struggling to combat the 
trafficking of narcotics in and out of the country (United States Department of State, 
2012) Large shipments of heroin from Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and cocaine from 
Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru are increasingly being reported and seized in Tanzania (United 
States Department of State, 2012b) . In one major seizure in Tanzania in December, 2010 
authorities captured fifty kg of heroin (Basar, 2012). 
There are also troubling signs the drug trade in Tanzania is becoming 
internationalized, with Tanzanians increasingly being seized in other countries in 
connection with drug trafficking. Two Pakistanis were arrested as a result of a seizure in 
February, 2012. Of fifty-five individuals charged in Tanzania with serious drug offenses 
in 2012, nearly a third were foreign nationals (United States Department of State, 2012).  
The transnational aspect of this problem is not simply foreign nationals coming to 
Tanzania. Many Tanzanians are now being caught abroad in connection with drug 
trafficking. In early 2004 the Chinese Xinhua News Agency reported  thirty-two 
Tanzanian nationals were caught in connection with the illegal drug trade in nine 
countries; including 13 in Pakistan and others in Kenya, Germany, India, Ethiopia, 
Britain, Uganda, Mauritius, and the UAE (Xinhua News Jan 7, 2005). UNODC data on 
the nationalities of those arrested in Pakistan for drug trafficking shows Tanzanians 
represent the third highest nationality of those arrested, preceded by Pakistanis and 
Nigerians (Basar, 2012). 
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The impact of drug trafficking in Tanzania is, perhaps, most troubling in 
Zanzibar. Zanzibar’s connections to producer states and European consumer states have 
made it an attractive transit point into the broader trafficking routes. The tiny airport in 
Zanzibar has direct flights to Oman and other Gulf States as well as Italy. This allows 
drugs to be fed directly from producer states into the Western drug consumption chain 
(Butcher, 2000). The fact that Zanzibar’s airport was privatized in 1998 has added to 
these fears, and many believe privatizing has made drug trafficking easier (Butcher, 
2000) and recent police busts of drug trafficking activities support concerns regarding the 
airports role. In March, 2013 police discovered a network of drug dealers using the 
airport, including four airport employees. A Greek national in transit to Italy was arrested 
in connection to the syndicate and 5 kg of narcotics were seized with a value over $200 
million (“Zanzibar officials in drug traffic network face music,” 2013). From January to 
March, 2013 six individuals, three of which were foreign nationals, were arrested at 
Zanzibar’s airport in connection with drug trafficking (“Police ‘bust’ Zanzibar drug 
dealers’ network,” 2013). In addition to modern transportation connections to drug 
producing states, security at official ports is almost non-existent and corruption at these 
ports is rampant (Vittori & Bremer, 2009). Zanzibar’s State Minister in the First Vice-
President’s office has stated that the illegal ports along the coast are proving to be 
problematic for stemming drug trafficking (“USA Donates Two Boats to Tanzania Anti-
drugs Fight,” 2012). 
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 When looking to the current impact of drug trafficking in West Africa, 
particularly Guinea-Bissau, it is readily apparent that a poor state such as Tanzania can be 
severely undermined by this illicit activity. Already there are significant structural 
weaknesses which impede the Tanzanian states capacity to comprehensively address this 
growing threat. The corruption that comes hand in hand with drug trafficking is eroding 
fragile state structures (Basar, 2012).  Tanzania’s stability is critical for this volatile 
region. The undermining of the already fragile Tanzanian state has obvious implications 
for security that extend to the East Africa region as a whole.  
 
Piracy 
Beginning in 2004 an escalation in pirate activity off the Horn of Africa and 
originating from Somalia alarmed observers. The explosion of pirate activity in 2008-09 
made piracy a dominant international security issue. Piracy’s impact on international 
security centers on economic and energy security, with piracy in the Horn and East 
Africa regions directly impacting world shipping markets (Kraska & Wilson, 2009). Sea 
borne trade is vital to the global economy having quadrupled over the past 40 years, with 
90% of international trade and two-thirds of petroleum dependent on sea transport (“A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” 2007). As of 2008, “Twenty thousand 
ships transit the Gulf of Aden annually…carrying 12 percent of the world’s daily oil 
supply…”(Kraska & Wilson, 2009, p. 55). The proximity of the Gulf of Aden to the Horn 
of Africa states makes it a tempting target.  
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While international attention focuses on contemporary piracy being a 
phenomenon of the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden, it has also significantly impacted 
East African states. In 2008 out of the two-hundred and ninety-three reported pirate 
attacks or attempts worldwide, one-hundred and twenty-five took place in East Africa 
(UNODC, 2009).Tanzania, in particular, has suffered from the threat of piracy. The 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) between 2001 and 2008 recorded 58 pirate attacks 
in Tanzania, with 34 of those attacks taking place between 2006-2008 (Nincic, 2009, p. 
4). During these years Tanzania incurred the third highest number of piracy attacks in 
Africa (Nincic, 2009, p. 2). That the vast majority of attacks in Tanzania have been 
perpetrated by Somali pirates demonstrates the reach of the threat.  
Since 2008 through 2012 the IMB (2013) has recorded only eight pirate attacks in 
Tanzania with no incidents reported in 2011. The IMB attributes this impressive drop in 
pirate attacks to increased regional naval patrols, the widespread adoption of best 
practices throughout East Africa, and political will to mitigate the threat of piracy. As a 
member of SADC Tanzania has benefitted from naval assistance from South Africa 
which has committed naval assets to patrol throughout Tanzanian waters as well as in the 
Mozambique Channel (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2013). Despite these 
important steps the director of the IMB has warned that unless these deterrent and best 
practice measures continue, piracy attacks in Tanzania could re-escalate and Tanzania is 
still vulnerable to piracy and its extensive negative impacts on the state’s security (ICC 
International Maritime Bureau, 2013). 
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Human Security Issues 
Terrorism, illicit trafficking, and piracy pose significant threats to Tanzania and 
transnational security. However threats to human security in those and other issue areas 
pose serious, and even more pervasive and chronic security challenges for Tanzania. The 
UNDP’s Human Development Index, which measures various indices of standards of 
living, access to education, and health, ranks Tanzania in the low human development 
category placing it at 152 out of 187 countries (UNDP, 2011). As one of the world’s 
poorest countries, Tanzanians face threats to their human security on a daily basis, 
creating path dependencies which threaten the country’s overall security and stability. 
Though the human security paradigm can incorporate many issues, this analysis will 
focus on the economic and health aspects of human security in Tanzania.  
Drug trafficking. From a human security viewpoint the impact of drug trafficking 
through Zanzibar on the islands population is striking. Recent figures place Zanzibar’s 
population as having amongst the highest per capita heroin addiction rates in the world, 
with an estimated 9,000 addicts on the small island (“Zanzibar Plagued by Growing 
Heroin Addiction,” 2012). Particularly hard hit is the young adult population. The 
infiltration of drugs is also tearing at the social fabric of Zanzibar’s predominantly 
Muslim population, and many older Zanzibari’s fear Zanzibar’s traditional Muslim 
beliefs and culture in Zanzibar are being eroded. Though drug use is on the rise 
throughout Tanzania, it is readily apparent in Zanzibar. As Zanzibar’s development 
languishes behind mainland Tanzania’s, the loss of the health and productivity of a vital 
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segment of the population bodes poorly for future growth and development. Leaders on 
both the Tanzanian mainland and Zanzibar have openly acknowledged the growing 
domestic illegal drug consumption rates are troubling for future growth and development 
(“Tanzania; Prayers for Kikwete’s Anti-Drugs War,” 2006). Yet Tanzania has significant 
structural and political impediments to comprehensively addressing this growing 
problem. Foremost among these issues is police capacity (United States Department of 
State, 2012).  
Piracy. Less noted as a security threat stemming from piracy are the threats to 
human security. The ripple effects from these impacts have far-reaching implications for 
Tanzania’s already fragile economy, including the economic security of Tanzanians who 
incur higher costs of living. The UNODC (2009) also notes piracy’s intersection with 
other criminal activities which threaten human security including arms trafficking and 
human trafficking. For states like Somalia whose populations rely heavily on 
international humanitarian aid, piracy can disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid and 
supplies. The disruption of these supplies is not only an economic loss to providing 
states, but exacerbates humanitarian emergencies. The impact on an already tenuous, at 
best, human security environment is immediately felt.  
 
Economic Security 
As detailed in the background of Tanzania, the country’s post-independence 
economic policies had a disastrous effect on the country’s economy and development. 
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Through extensive reform efforts which began in the mid-1990’s Tanzania has steadily 
reversed the negative consequences of Nyerere’s African Socialism economic policies, 
and has achieved economic growth. Yet the economy remains highly donor dependent, 
which accounts for 30% of the country’s budget (CIA, 2011). The economy also lacks 
overall global competitiveness with a ranking of 120 out of 144 by the World Economic 
Forum’s global competitiveness index (World Economic Forum, 2012).  
Aside from a feeble national economy the vast majority of the population still 
faces chronic economic insecurity, particularly in rural areas. A comparison of 
Tanzania’s GDP (PPP) per capita to the rest of sub-Saharan Africa reveals that 
Tanzania’s, at $553, is significantly below the composite regional average (World 
Economic Forum, 2012). The country’s overall poverty rate remains high, with the most 
recent household budget survey finding the current rate at around 34%  and the 
percentage of people who suffer from hunger at 16% (African Development Bank Group, 
2012). In addition to persistent poverty and economic insecurity there is also a sizeable 
economic inequality gap in Tanzania. A common measurement used to gauge a country’s 
inequality in wealth or income is the GINI coefficient which utilizes a scale from 0 to 
100, with 0 expressing perfect equality and 100 showing maximum inequality. In 2007 
the World Bank’s development indicators placed Tanzania’s GINI coefficient at 37.6 
(“GINI Index,” n.d.).  
Much of the economic insecurity experienced by Tanzanians is a result of the 
country’s weak education system. At first glance it would seem Tanzania’s education 
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system is impressive for a poor state, it has high primary education enrollment rates 
reaching 95.9% on the mainland and 83.6% in Zanzibar with near gender parity (“UNDP: 
Tanzania Millennium Development Goals,” 2010). The recent gains in primary education 
have moved Tanzania into the twenty-seventh
 
position in the world for enrollment rate 
(World Economic Forum, 2012). Yet these high primary education enrollment rates have 
not translated into progressive gains in secondary and university education rates. 
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (2012) the 
quality of primary education in Tanzania’s is poor, ranked 114th in the world, and 
secondary and university education enrollment rates are among the lowest in the world, 
each ranked at 137
th 
. The passage rates for the national secondary education 
examinations are abysmal. In 2012, 65% of students failed the exam (Mwakyusa, 2013). 
The education system is failing Tanzanians, stunting their ability to ensure their 
economic security and create a stronger and more dynamic national economy. 
 
Health Security 
 Another major human security issue in Tanzania is health security. Overall life 
expectancy at birth remains low at 57 years (UNDP, 2011). According to World Health 
Organization (WHO) statistics in most categories Tanzania has worse health outcomes 
than the regional averages (World Health Organization, 2006). The most recent statistics 
show malaria infection rates at roughly 26,000 per 100,000 in the population and 
tuberculosis cases 177 per 100,000 (World Economic Forum, 2012). Threats to maternal 
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and child health are particularly troubling in Tanzania. The infant mortality rate is 78 per 
1,000 live births, maternal mortality ratio 1,500 per 100,000 live births, and an under-five 
mortality rate of 126 out of 1,000 (World Health Organization, 2006). Data indicates the 
percentage of births attended by a skilled physician on the mainland is only around 50% 
(African Development Bank Group, 2012).  
Healthcare expenditures consume a significant portion of the income of 
Tanzanians. According to the World Bank in 2010 Tanzanians paid 41% out-of-pocket 
private expenditures and 13.6% out-of-pocket in total expenditures on health (“Out-of-
pocket Health Expenditure,” n.d.). Using significant portions of income for health 
expenditures exacerbates the already precarious economic security of many Tanzanians.  
One of the primary concerns for Tanzania’s health security is HIV/AIDs. With the 
12
th
 highest infection rate globally, Tanzania is one of the countries most affected by the 
HIV/AIDs epidemic. Declared as a national disaster by the government in 2000, by 2003 
the infection rate was placed at around 8.3%, translating to 1.6 to 2 million infected 
persons (Dagne, 2010). Due to the government’s adoption of a national policy on 
HIV/AIDS in 2001 and aggressive action by the international community, Tanzania’s 
HIV/AIDS infection rates have stabilized and slightly decreased. Nonetheless, UNAIDS 
places the current number of Tanzanians living with HIV/AIDS at 1.6 million, the 
prevalence rate at 5.8%, and the number of orphans due to HIV/AIDS aged 0 to 17 
between 1.2 to 1.4 million (“United Republic of Tanzania,” 2011).  
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The HIV/AIDS epidemic has serious implications for human security in Tanzania. 
Research has demonstrated that HIV/AIDS; drops life expectancies, and hollows out the 
professional class and the most economically productive segments of a population, 
resulting in potentially destabilizing youth bulges. High HIV/AIDS rates also contract 
GDP growth, impacts household incomes and livelihoods worsening poverty, eroding 
communities and their social fabric, with disproportionately negative impacts on women 
and girls (Cuddington, 1993). In poor states like Tanzania, these factors place extreme 
pressure and strain on already fragile health and social security systems and services 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2006; Cuddington, 1993).  
 
Summary  
Combatant commands play a central and vital role in the execution of U.S. 
national security policy in their respective AOR’s. AFRICOM’s creation signaled a 
significant shift in the conceptualization of Africa’s strategic significance to the U.S. and 
its joint, whole of government modus operandi represented a concurrent shift in the 
conceptualization of U.S. national security policy. The views of both proponents and 
opponents of AFRICOM have validity. The purpose of this assessment will be to 
examine if either proponents or opponents are correct about AFRICOM in the context of 
Tanzania.  
In the case of Tanzania there are various benefits and limits to how the command 
can address Tanzania’s security issues. The Tanzanian government faces a chronic 
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shortage of resources, which has a serious impact on its ability to address these complex 
security challenges. In this regard AFRICOM is beneficial for addressing Tanzanian 
security issues because of the resources it can bring. Indeed, training and logistics are 
crucial components to addressing the country’s traditional security issues and these are 
important resource contributions AFRICOM can make. The limits of AFRICOM’s ability 
to address Tanzania’s security issues stem from the fact that it is a military organization. 
As a military organization AFRICOM lacks the institutional culture, knowledge, and 
mandate to holistically address human security issues. Though this was intended to be 
remedied through the integration of interagency personnel, shortcomings in this regard 
significantly limit the commands ability to address human insecurity.  
Likewise, there are benefits and limits to how AFRICOM will be able to address 
U.S. security interests in Tanzania. One important potential benefit for U.S. security 
interests will be that AFRICOM can help develop better institutional understanding of the 
country’s security dynamics. An important benefit for both the U.S. and Tanzania is the 
single point of contact a combatant command provides, mitigating the communication 
complexities and policy execution seams that were a factor in the regions prior 
trifurcation amongst combatant commands.  Another benefit of AFRICOM for both 
Tanzania and the U.S. is that it corrects a bureaucratic imbalance. And given that Africa 
has traditionally occupied the back waters of U.S. strategic concerns, the allocation of 
more resources and policy attention could create better strategic engagement with 
Tanzania, serving both U.S. and Tanzanian security interests.  
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Because of the continuity of AFRICOM’s strategic objectives and mission 
statement over the course of the last couple of years, it is unlikely that the style or 
substance of AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania will be significantly altered for the 
foreseeable future.  In his final testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham (2013, p. 2) singled out the command’s 
relationship with Tanzania stating, “We are deepening our relationship with the 
Tanzanian military, a professional force whose capabilities and influence increasingly 
bear on regional security issues in eastern and southern Africa and the Great Lakes 
region”. This statement indicates AFRICOM is satisfied with its current form of 
engagement with Tanzania, and the outcomes to date. This assessment will determine 
whether or not the terms of engagement are, in fact, beneficial for both U.S. and 
































This assessment has three central research questions: what is the impact of 
AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in Tanzania? To what extent has 
AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in Tanzania? What is the public 
perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? The aim of this chapter is to 
address the questions regarding impacts on U.S. national security and human insecurity. 
To do so, this chapter will give an overview of the commands current activities in 
Tanzania, and a brief analysis of how those activities impact human security challenges. 
 
 The Impact of AFRICOM on U.S. National Security Policy in Tanzania 
In his 2008 Senate testimony AFRICOM’s first Commander Gen. Ward stated, 
“From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to 
address the changing security challenges confronting the U.S. in the 21
st
 century” (Ward, 
2008). When AFRICOM was announced it was presented as a new and innovative 
“combatant command plus.” Officials stated that it would depart from the traditional 
personnel structure for combatant commands. This departure would include the 
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integration of high level civilian officials, in addition to a greater proportion of 
interagency personnel distributed throughout the command, working side by side with 
military planners, logisticians, and operations personnel. These structural changes were 
intended to be a reflection of how AFRICOM would be a combatant command which 
embraced the concepts of “new jointness” and “whole of government.” As chapter one 
detailed, the shift to joint, whole of government operations was a direct result of U.S. 
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hodge (2011, p. 212) has argued that “Africa was 
the new laboratory for ‘getting it right,’” to demonstrate the lessons learned from those 
conflicts, and be the poster child for the next generation of DoD theatre engagement.  
Former AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham’s March 2013 testimony before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee (2013, p. 2) highlighted U.S. AFRICOM’s 
engagement with Tanzania, and the country’s role in regional security. He stated, “We 
are deepening our relationship with the Tanzanian military, a professional force whose 
capabilities and influence increasingly bear on regional security issues in eastern and 
southern Africa and the Great Lakes region.” Currently Tanzania is eligible to participate 
in twelve of AFRICOM’s security cooperation programs and exercises, and participates 
in ten. Table 3.1 lists these programs and exercises, those it participates in, and 
descriptions of each.  
 Table 3.1  Tanzania Participation in AFRICOM 















The focus of APS is to build maritime safety and security by 
increasing maritime awareness, response capabilities and 
infrastructure. 
X 
MEDCAP The Medical Civil Action Program enhances partner nation 
health care capacity and reduces the threat of disease by 
collaborating with local medical professionals, interagency 
partners and local authorities.  
X 
AMLEP The African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership 
(AMLEP) program enables African partner nations to build 
maritime security capacity and improve management of their 
maritime environment through combined law enforcement 
operations. 
 
IMET The International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program provides funds for international personnel to attend 
U.S. military professional training programs. The IMET 
program exposes foreign students to U.S. professional 
military organizations and procedures and the manner in 





The objective of PMHAP is to support capacity building and 
development of HIV/AIDS policy within African militaries 
and to assist African partner military’s leadership with 





In partnership with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), the Pandemic Response Program 
(PRP) assists African militaries to develop influenza 
pandemic response plans that are integrated into their 






The State Partnership Program is a key U.S. security 
cooperation tool that facilitates cooperation across all 
aspects of international civil-military affairs and encourages 
people-to-people ties at the state level, building relationships 
that enhance global security, understanding and cooperation 
 
VETCAP VETCAP, the Veterinary Civil Action Program, delivers 
veterinary programs in support of strategic military 
objectives.  
X 
ACOTA ACOTA provides a full range of peacekeeping training and 
instruction tailored to match a country’s needs and 
capabilities. The program focuses on sub-Saharan African 
soldiers from partner nations who are scheduled to 




Exercise Cutlass Express focuses on addressing piracy 
through information sharing and coordinated operations 




Eastern Accord is a military exercise focusing on 
humanitarian aid/disaster response with East African nations 




Source: (“United States Africa Command,” n.d.) 
 This table proves illustrative regarding U.S. national security policy in Tanzania, 
as well as to what extent the Tanzanian government’s security concerns converge with 
those of the U.S. Regarding the command’s impact on U.S. national security policy, that 
AFRICOM has been able to maintain a high degree of cooperation from Tanzania in the 
programs and exercises for which it eligible, is indicative that it is successively executing 
U.S. national security policy. Indeed, if the primary objective of U.S. national security 
policy in Africa is building partner capacity  in order for African states to assume the 
primary responsibility for regional security (Warner, 2013), high levels of participation in 
the programs and exercises offered by the U.S. is critical to the degree of impact and 
success of U.S. policy. The evidence from this table indicates AFRICOM is having a 
positive impact on U.S. national security policy in Tanzania.  
The high degree of cooperation in the programs and exercises for which it is 
eligible also signals a convergence of U.S. and Tanzanian security interests. This is 
important from both a U.S. policy and Tanzanian security perspective. It is important for 
U.S. policy to be reflective and responsive to the security challenges African states face, 
in order for the U.S. to build strong strategic partnerships and mitigate security threats. 
Tanzania’s high degree of participation signals that AFRICOM is not only executing U.S. 
respond to regional security threats posed by Violent 
Extremist Groups and to more effectively counter the 
associated Violent Extremist Ideology. 
Natural Fire The objective of Natural Fire is to prepare Eastern African 
countries and U.S. forces for combined peace support, 





national security policy, but that U.S. policy is addressing threats which are of 
importance to the Tanzanian government. 
Focused interviews were conducted with three current and former high-level U.S. 
officials, including two former Ambassador’s to East African states and a current 
AFRICOM employee. The interviews consisted of the following questions: How does 
Tanzania figure in the U.S. strategic vision of the East African region? What are the 
challenges and what are the advantages of operating in Tanzania? How, if at all, do 
AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania differ from other states in the region? Have 
Tanzanians articulated any concerns about AFRICOM? If so, what concerns? Using a 
broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing security concerns in 
Tanzania? Do you feel AFRICOM had enhanced, hindered, or had no impact on U.S.-
Tanzanian bilateral relations?  
Interviews with U.S. personnel revealed a generally positive perception of the 
command’s impact in Tanzania, both in executing U.S. national security policy and 
ameliorating the country’s security challenges. In general, interviewees attributed 
AFRICOM’s successes in Tanzania to the overall strengthening of U.S.-Tanzanian 
bilateral ties, which has occurred throughout the past two U.S. and Tanzanian 
administrations. One former Ambassador to Tanzania noted that, beginning with 
President Mkapa and continuing with President Kikwete, Tanzania has been receptive 
and pursued a closer bilateral relationship with the U.S. He felt the two countries 
currently enjoy a generally positive relationship with one another, due to Mkapa and 
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Kikwete’s pro-American stances and increased development aid, security cooperation, 
diplomatic exchanges, and high-level symbolic gestures from the U.S.  
Recent U.S. diplomatic gestures from include President Bush’s visit to Tanzania 
in 2007, making him the first U.S. President to visit Tanzania. Later, the first African 
head of state to meet with President Obama was President Kikwete of Tanzania. The 
significance of these gestures was not lost on Tanzanians. A former U.S. Ambassador to 
Tanzania felt these moves went a long way to solidifying recent gains in bilateral 
relations. In his view, Tanzania is now one of U.S.’s closest partners in Africa. A current 
AFRICOM employee working in the region also noted that Obama’s subsequent three 
country tour of Africa in 2013, and the inclusion of Tanzania on the itinerary, is further 
indication of the stature the U.S. accords the country and the growth in bilateral relations. 
Another former ambassador to a neighboring country noted these diplomatic overtures, 
emphasizing U.S. interest in Tanzania as tied to its geostrategic significance to the 
regional economy.  
The former Ambassador to Tanzania also felt the country’s recent pro-American 
pivot had also been reflected in the country’s military relations. The former Ambassador 
recalled that, soon after becoming president, Kikwete expressed a desire for Tanzania to 
play a more active role in regional peacekeeping missions. As a result, he sought to build 
the capacity of the country’s military, and moved fairly quickly to enhance military ties 
and promote those in the military with links to the U.S. Historically, Tanzania’s military 
 68 
 
ties had been with the Soviet Union and China. This created culture institution problems 
for Kikwete’s attempts to strengthen military ties to the U.S.  
In explaining the difficulties these historic ties created in U.S.-Tanzania military-
to-military relations, he cited one example of a former commander of the Tanzanian 
military, the Tanzanian Peoples Defense Force (TPDF). This commander had received 
his military education and training from the former Soviet Union. Consequently he was 
hostile to the idea of the U.S. and Tanzanian militaries having a significant degree of 
cooperation, not even allowing U.S. military vessels in Tanzanian ports. Efforts to 
enhance military ties with the U.S. were, for a time, delayed by this commander. After his 
retirement Kikwete immediately filled the position with someone who was pro-
American.  
According to the former U.S. Ambassador, U.S. military and diplomatic 
personnel were shocked by the overnight positive change this effected in U.S.-Tanzanian 
military relations. While this may have had a positive impact of military-military 
relations, the AFRICOM employee cast doubts on whether this had led to a drastic 
change in the degree of engagement between the two militaries. Indeed this person felt 
that AFRICOM has had a positive impact on bilateral relations, especially because recent 
U.S. counter-piracy efforts have been important for protecting the commercial viability of 
the Dar es Salaam port.  But when asked to characterize the nature of AFRICOM’s 
activities in Tanzania, the response was “expanding, but not robust.”  
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According to the former U.S. Ambassador, during his tenure Tanzania’s 
leadership became gradually more aware of how AFRICOM and U.S. security 
cooperation and assistance could aid their efforts to become more active in regional 
security issues. He recalled the African Union’s 2008 intervention in Comoros as a 
critical point for AFRICOM in Tanzania. According to this official, during the Comoros 
intervention he and other high-level U.S. officials in Tanzania pointed out to their 
counterparts how AFRICOM played a beneficial role to Tanzania during the intervention; 
stressing that a command for Africa demonstrates respect. In his experience, Kikwete 
seemed receptive to AFRICOM, and receptivity to the command was slowly growing in 
the military and government by the end of his tenure. This interviewee also recalled how 
U.S. officials became fully aware of the positive role AFRICOM could play, in terms of 
serving as a single point of contact for coordination and assistance for African states and 
regional organizations. Nonetheless, when the AFRICOM employee was asked the 
question, “Using a broad definition, what issues does the U.S. view as the most pressing 
security concerns in Tanzania?” he singled out counter-piracy and stopping the spread of 
Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab further into Tanzania, signaling that the command’s primary 
emphasis is on traditional security concerns.    
Both the table illustrating Tanzanian cooperation in AFRICOM programs and 
exercises and the interviews point to AFRICOM having a positive impact on U.S. 
national security policy in Tanzania. Tanzanian participation in most of AFRICOM’s 
activities means the command is successfully fulfilling its role in executing U.S. security 
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policy. The evidence also suggests that since it is now a single point of contact, the 
command has made it easier for military and diplomatic personal to both coordinate and 
leverage the resources of the U.S. military in U.S.-Tanzanian relations. Moreover, 
interview responses indicating President Kikwete’s growing receptivity to AFRICOM 
indicate that AFRICOM could not only be positively impacting U.S. national security 
policy in Tanzania, but also regionally. As President Kikwete seeks for Tanzania to play 
a greater role in East African security, his receptivity to AFRICOM bodes well for the 
command’s impact that the policies it seeks to execute.  
 
The Impact of AFRICOM on Human Security in Tanzania 
Three of the ten programs and exercises Tanzania participates in (Cutlass Express, 
Eastern Accord, and the Africa Partnership Station) focus on more traditional security 
issues, namely terrorism and maritime security. While the focus of these programs is 
predominantly on terrorism and maritime security they utilize a capacity building 
approach with a traditional focus on military training, professionalization, and logistics 
training. Five of the security cooperation programs, focus on issues that are not strictly 
military. These programs (MEDCAP, Partner Military HIV/AIDS, Pandemic Response, 
and VETCAP) span a diverse range of issues including veterinary medicine and public 
health issues, including influenza pandemics and HIV/AIDS.  The exercise Natural Fire 
focuses on humanitarian civic assistance and disaster relief. These programs and 
exercises illustrate that AFRICOM is engaging with issues related to human security. In 
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terms of interagency cooperation, three of the programs Tanzania participates in are 
interagency; ACOTA and IMET (Department of State), and Pandemic Response 
(USAID).  
 While security programs and exercises constitute the core of AFRICOM’s 
activities in Tanzania, the literature and interviews also periodically brought up 
AFRICOM’s involvement in school and well building projects in Tanzania. There is no 
evidence that these are a consistent or an integral aspect of the command’s activities. 
Typically these activities were conducted by civilian affairs teams from the Combined 
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Moreover a 2010 review of CJTF-HOA 
civilian affairs teams and their work in East Africa found that there was a lack of socio-
cultural and language training for these teams, a poor understanding of how their work fit 
within the larger whole of government approach, and remarkable discrepancies in how 
the personnel in civilian affairs teams understood the mission of their work (Farrell & 
Lee, 2010). 
Nonetheless, both the former ambassador to Tanzania and AFRICOM employee 
emphasized traditional transnational threats as the locus of the command’s objectives and 
activities. Though the ambassador mentioned a couple instances of humanitarian related 
work in Tanzania, such as a vaccination drives, both he and the AFRICOM employee 
heavily emphasized the commands role in preventing the spread of violent extremism and 
maritime security.  
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AFRICOM’s integration of interagency personnel and its funding sources provide 
another key insight into the command’s impact on human insecurity in Tanzania. Without 
interagency personnel pushing for the command to address human insecurity and the 
command lacking the personnel expertise and funding necessary to leverage human 
security as a priority, the command will focus predominantly on traditional security 
issues. Though the Defense Department  originally envisioned having upwards of a 
quarter of AFRICOM’s staff comprised of interagency personnel, roughly 125 billets, 
meeting this target has proven to be difficult (Ploch, 2011). According to a former 
AFRICOM official, of the Commands approximately 1,500 personnel only forty are 
interagency and of those fifteen are from the intelligence community, therefore only 
twenty-five are true interagency personnel (anonymous, personal communication). These 
low numbers of interagency personnel are supported by a  Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) review (2010) of AFRICOM. That review compared interagency personnel 
numbers in 2008 and 2010 and found that the total in 2010 had increased to twenty-seven 
from thirteen in 2008, but overall the percentage of interagency personnel was still only 
at 2%, far short of the original goal of 25%. It was argued that AFRICOM’s ability to 
address and mitigate human insecurity would stem from the integration of significant 
numbers of interagency personnel throughout the command.  
Indeed, a former AFRICOM official felt that the lack of interagency personnel 
resulted in the command formulating plans which were not truly whole of government 
(anonymous, personal communication). GAO interviews with interagency personnel 
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found that AFRICOM is not always involving other federal agencies in the formative 
stages of activity planning, and does not fully leverage expertise of interagency personnel 
embedded at AFRICOM. Some stated they have to work to insert themselves into 
meetings at the command and ask what they can do to contribute, rather than being 
actively and eagerly utilized by command leadership and personnel (Government 
Accountability Office, 2010, p. 35). These observations from former personnel and 
official statistics demonstrate that AFRICOM’s integration of significant numbers of 
interagency personnel remains unfulfilled. That this integration has not occurred provides 
insight on the command’s ability to impact human security. Without interagency 
personnel, AFRICOM lacks the requisite expertise and the institutional momentum 
required to prioritize human insecurity in its activities.  
Another factor complicating the ability for the command to address human 
insecurity in Tanzania is its funding sources, which directly steer AFRICOM towards 
addressing traditional security issues. The command has to juggle twenty-two different 
funding sources, many of which have varying time horizons and restrictions on the terms 
of their use (Warner, 2013). Further compounding the coordination of AFRICOM’s 
funding sources, according to AFRICOM’s director of strategy, plans, and programs 
Major General Charles Hooper at a March, 2013 roundtable on Civil Affairs at George 
Mason University, is the fact that many of these funding sources are designated for 
counterterrorism. Major General Hooper stated that coordinating and managing these 
diverse funding sources is incredibly complex due to the need to identify what funds can 
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go to what programs and what countries. As Warner (2013) notes the complicated nature 
of AFRICOM’s funding sources makes it difficult for the command to engage in long-
term planning interagency planning, and to align its activities with the priorities of 
partner African states. Without funding that is specifically designated with a whole of 
government approach in mind the command is hampered in its ability to plan and 
integrate activities that address human security.  
AFRICOM could do more to impact both U.S. national security policy and human 
security in Tanzania if it engaged in security sector reform. According to Major General 
Charles Hooper, the director of AFRICOM’s strategy, plans, and programs, Africa’s size 
and the diversity of its threats have led to the command developing four subordinate 
regional campaign plans, rather than the standard single theatre campaign plan used by 
other combatant commands. The East Africa campaign plan entails combating violent 
extremist organizations (VEO’s) through bi-lateral and multinational efforts and security 
sector reform once Al Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are defeated.  
The sequencing in the East African campaign plan is flawed. Combatting and, 
ultimately, defeating violent extremist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al Shabaab in 
East Africa is dependent on an effective security sector, particularly a well-trained police 
force. On this point this researches findings diverge from current literature, positing that 
AFRICOM needs to engage with the security sector in Tanzania, specifically the police, 
which is in desperate need of training, education, and reform. Similar to most African 
states, Tanzania’s police are poorly trained, equipped, and insufficiently resourced. 
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Weaknesses in the country’s security sector exacerbate both traditional and human 
security threats.  
Research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) found, on average, Tanzanian 
police officers receive only six months of training and the Tanzanian Police Force (TPF) 
suffers from a lack of effective record keeping, and a slow moving legal system which 
hampers police work. ISS also found poor public opinion of the TPF largely due to 
extreme delays in investigations and the TPF’s dismissive attitude towards sexual and 
gender based violence. Lacking special services and training the police generally tell 
victims of sexual and gender based crimes they should be handled as a family matter 
(Robins, 2009). Afrobarometer’s survey results in Tanzania help further illustrate the low 
degree of public trust in the country’s police. When asked about how much they trust the 
police 13% said “not at all,” 25% “just a little,” and 35% “somewhat.” When asked about 
how many police where involved in corruption only 5% said “none,” while 48% “some,” 
and 27% “most of them” (AFROBAROMETER, 2008). 
The deficiencies of the TPF have wide ranging and every day implications for 
security of Tanzanians. Currently, AFRICOM is not allowed to train foreign law 
enforcement personnel under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Under current 
rules AFRICOM would need to be given a special waiver. Despite AFRICOM having 
stepped back from the “Combatant Command plus” model, an exception allowing the 
command to engage in police training and professionalization would directly impact 
development outcomes and the overall status of human security in Tanzania. 
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Better community policing is critical for addressing terrorism and drug 
trafficking, transnational treats which heavily rely on local law enforcement solutions. As 
Warner (2013, p. 12) notes, “Left unaddressed, U.S. restrictions on funding police reform 
will be a gaping hole in U.S. interagency efforts to build partner security capacity in 
Africa”. Reform of the TPF will help mitigate threats to Tanzania’s stability and security 
and, by extension, U.S. interests. Without SSR security capacity building efforts in 
Tanzania are incomplete. A better trained and professionalized police force also helps 
human security, especially gender based and sexual violence which are also vectors for 
the spread of HIV/AIDS and cause other health risks. Moreover, better trained and 
resourced police forces improve overall community security and prevent the 




AFRICOM is having a positive impact on U.S. national security policy in 
Tanzania, signified by the generally high degree of engagement the command has 
cultivated with Tanzania. The country’s high degree of participation in the command’s 
security cooperation trainings and exercises means U.S. security policy is being executed. 
Interviews also highlighted the positive impact the consistent focus and single point of 
contact AFRICOM affords U.S.-Tanzanian bilateral relations  
Regarding the question of the command’s focus on human security issues, the 
details of AFRICOM’s in-country activities in Tanzania reveal that, in practice, 
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AFRICOM’s concentration on human security and development issues falls far short of 
the scope and degree articulated by officials during, and immediately following, the 
creation of AFRICOM. Additional evidence regarding the command’s minimal impact on 
human security in Tanzania can be found in the low number of interagency personnel 
AFRICOM has integrated, and direction in which the command’s funding drives its 
activities. This evidence supports the views of opponents. This is not to say AFRICOM 
does not at all engage in these types of activities in Tanzania. Several of its security 
cooperation programs and exercises do focus on humanitarian and public health issues, 
and civilian affairs teams periodically perform development related work.  It can also be 
argued cooperation and engagement with the Tanzanian military and civilian affairs 
teams interacting and working with local populations are a form of diplomatic functions, 
which help cultivate stronger bilateral ties. Indeed, interviewees all indicated that they 
felt the command had helped create stronger bilateral ties with Tanzania.  
Yet it is important to note how all of the programs and exercises which focus on 
non-traditional and are interagency are focused on the military. For example, the 
HIV/AIDS program works on prevention and treatment of the disease within the 
Tanzanian military. Therefore, although there is topical breadth and interagency 
cooperation, the target of AFRICOM’s focus remains on the Tanzanian military and 
traditional security issues. While not diminishing the importance of these efforts, the 
available information on AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania and interview responses 
shows a clear emphasis on a more traditional conception of security, rather than human 
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security. This evidence of AFRICOM’s activities in Tanzania call into question the 
command’s whole of government approach and, overall, supports the views of opponents 
of AFRICOM.  
The truth AFRICOM has faced is that the U.S. does not have the personnel 
necessary to meet the demands and mandates of civilian agencies, let alone divert 
significant numbers to a new military combatant command. Hodge (2011) notes that 
AFRICOM’s interagency structure and whole of government modus operandi was 
premised on an assumption that it would be able to command the requisite military, 
diplomatic, and conflict prevention resources. One of the officials interviewed by Hodge 
(2011, p. 227) even stated, 
“The supposition that we are making here is that the whole-of-government 
interagency planning and framework has been cured, there have been the proper 
structures built in terms of a special coordinator for reconstruction and 
stability…the requisite expertise in terms of Civilian Response Corps—additional 
subject matter experts that are almost like an interagency reserve force—have 
come online”. 
 
AFRICOM was created with a vision of what U.S. government security and state 
building capabilities would be like as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet 
these new resources and bureaucratic reconfigurations were not a reality for AFRICOM 

















To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in 
Tanzania? What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public? 
This projects chief research questions focus on the impact of AFRICOM on U.S. national 
security policy in Tanzania, to what extent the command is addressing threats to human 
security in Tanzania, and the Tanzanian public’s perception of the command. To help 
answer these questions, this chapter details the most salient security threats in Tanzania, 
and the results of a content analysis of the country’s most prominent newspapers and an 
online discussion forum. The aim of this chapter is to present evidence from the 
Tanzanian perspective that will be central in answering these research questions.  
 
Public Perceptions about AFRICOM among Tanzanians 
When AFRICOM was announced it generated sudden, often visceral, reactions 
from leadership within African states, and their citizens. Some African countries, notably 
South Africa and Nigeria, had their newspapers filled with angry assertions that the U.S. 
was seeking to put its military in African states and that AFRICOM was but the final 
iteration of U.S. neo-colonialism. Ultimately the ability for AFRICOM to execute U.S. 
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military and foreign policy in Africa is dependent upon the acceptance of African heads 
of states. If public opinion in African states is adamantly opposed to AFRICOM, leaders 
are less likely cooperate and engage with the command and U.S. Africa policy will 
languish. For this reason, in-depth knowledge of public opinion in African states is 
critical for the command; ideally shaping the command’s priorities, approach, and 
outreach efforts. 
Assessing public opinions also lends important insights into whether Africans 
view AFRICOM as serving their security or merely U.S. security interests, helping to 
highlight areas where the U.S. can adjust and alter its Africa policy. With these issues in 
mind this analysis compares and contrasts perceptions of AFRICOM in popular 
newspapers and social media sources in Tanzania to gain a better understanding of how 
the Tanzanian public views AFRICOM, and the manner in which news sources are 
informing those views.   
For this assessment five of the most popular newspapers in Tanzania were chosen. 
The two English language publications chosen were the Citizen and Daily News. The 
remaining three, Mwananchi, Tanzania Daima, and An-nuur (an Islamic newspaper) are 
Swahili language publications. Each publication’s website, with the exception of An-
nuur, was searched to find articles about AFRICOM.  All Africa.com, a website which 
compiles and archives articles from African publications, and Lexis Nexis were also 
searched to see if there were additional articles that did not appear in a search of the 
publications’ websites. An-nuur’s articles on AFRICOM were pulled from a Lexis Nexis 
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search of the BBC’s Global Monitoring Service. In these searches three opinion pieces 
written by Tanzanians, but not published in the five selected publications were also 
found. These three opinion pieces were included and coded because they represented 
Tanzanian views on AFRICOM and the restrictions on freedom of speech may have 
made it impossible for them to be published in Tanzanian newspapers.  
The search resulted in sixty-five articles. Articles were then qualitatively 
evaluated and coded as either being positive, negative, or neutral. To be coded as positive 
an article generally had to positively remark about AFRICOM’s engagement and 
activities or how it was impacting U.S. Africa relations. An example of phrasing that led 
to an article being coded as positive is, 
 “a recent symposium to engage academic professionals held in Dar es 
Salaam whose expertise includes history, political science, security studies, civil-
military relations and conflict management, demonstrated the role of Africom in a 
non-militaristic approach to resolve some of the chronic problems facing the 
continent, notwithstanding the state of anarchism in Somalia” (Mjasiri, 2012)  
  
To be coded as negative an article negatively remarked about AFRICOM and its 
activities, priorities, and its impact on U.S. Africa relations. Examples of the kind of 
phrasing that led to an article being coded as negative are:  
“there in America, newspapers publish maps of the ten places in the world in 
which the military currently is. These areas indeed show that America goes where 
it can get what it needs, like oil and minerals. This, indeed, is the geography of 
imperialism (trans)” (Visram, 2012) 
“We do not have to wait for the prophet to come down and tell us that 
welcoming the United States Army to set up an Africom base in Africa is opening 
the doors to colonialism (trans)” (“President Karume should leave office in peace 
without selling off Pemba,” 2010) 
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Neutral meant either the article was a news report or no bias could be detected. 
An example of phrasing that led to an article being coded as neutral is, “The US Africa 
Command (Africom) has assured that there are no immediate plans to establish its 
headquarters on the continent and has instead called for improvement in regional 
cooperation among African armies” (Mtambalike, 2012).  Roughly 64% of the sixty-two 
articles were coded as being negative, 34% as neutral, and 1% positive.  
A closer look at the distribution and origins of the coding results provides 
interesting insights into origination points of Tanzanian opinions of AFRICOM. Daily 
News is an English language newspaper owned by the Tanzanian government. None of 
the nine results from Daily News were coded as negative, one was positive and the 
remaining eight were coded as neutral. By comparison the Citizen, a privately owned 
English language publication, four of the fifteen articles were negative, eleven were 
neutral, and none were positive. The search of Tanzania Daima resulted in only two 
articles, one negative and one neutral. The eleven Mwananchi articles on AFRICOM 
were all coded as negative. Mwananchi is owned by the same company as the Citizen but 
published in Swahili. Similarly the Islamic Swahili language newspaper An-nuur had 
twenty-two of its twenty-five results categorized as negative with the remaining three 
being neutral.  
An even clearer picture emerges when these results are disaggregated. Articles 
from the government owned Daily News were fewer in quantity than other sources, 
overwhelmingly neutral about AFRICOM, and contained the only positive article. The 
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privately owned Citizen had more articles and was more likely to be negative. 
Importantly, criticism of AFRICOM was overwhelming more likely to be in Swahili 
language publications. In English language publications 16% of the articles were 
negative, if the three opinion pieces by Tanzanians from other publications are included 
that percentage increases to 25.9%. By contrast, in Swahili language publications 89 % of 
the articles were negative. Excluding the Islamic An-nuur, that percentage remains high 
at 92 %. Mwananchi illustrates the English/Swahili dynamics well. Although owned by 
the same company, Mwananchi’s articles were 100% negative whereas the English 
language Citizen had 26% negative coverage. 
The second resource used to assess Tanzanian perceptions and opinions of 
AFRICOM was Jamii Forums, a Tanzanian discussion forum website. It is a widely 
known website among Tanzanians and has over 100,000 registered members. The tagline 
of Jamii Forums is “Where we dare to talk openly.” Because of Tanzania’s freedom of 
press limitations, and the small number of people who participate in newspaper 
publications, collecting date from this large news and discussion forum affords a more 
comprehensive picture of Tanzanian perceptions and attitudes about AFRICOM. 
To collect data from Jamii Forums a search for the word “AFRICOM” was done, 
pulling up all discussion threads containing “AFRICOM” in their content. Each thread 
was then read or, if there were hundreds of responses, searched for the words 
“AFRICOM,” “Marekani,” and “jeshi” (“America” and “military” in Swahili and 
English). Any comments which specifically referred to AFRICOM or activities for which 
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it is responsible (such as military exercises) were collected and coded. The code used was 
the same as that used for the newspaper data; positive, negative, neutral.  
An example of a response that was coded as positive is,  
“I always appreciate usa for their suportive nature, we use alot of chinese 
inquality products with no any human support from them, for a long period joseph 
cony in uganda killing our sisters and brothers no any arabic nation or china say 
anything right now usa get in charge you start blaming usa. [sic]” (“Wamarekani 
wanazidi kujikita kijeshi barani Africa,” 2011).  
 
An example of a response that was coded as negative is,  
“It has nothing to do with Al Shabaab. It has to do with AFRICOM, chase 
away China and India, control, grab resources, recolonize Africa or better say 
enslave Africans as they are used to it. Kill them, starve them and control them so 
they fall in line with US-Western countries interests” (“Wamarekani wanazidi 
kujikita kijeshi barani Africa,” 2011).  
 
An example of a response that was coded as neutral is, (speaking about different 
military structures) “they protect their border and inside their own country, it is also 
different because they have commanders for AFRICOM in Africa” (trans) 
(“Makomandoo wa Bongo,” 2011). For this data assessing neutrality was more of a 
challenge than in newspapers, but was predominantly coded when a respondent asked a 
clarifying question.  
In initial discussions with Tanzanian professors about knowledge and perceptions 
of AFRICOM in the general Tanzanian public, the author was told the general public 
would have little knowledge and few opinions about AFRICOM. The number of 
responses and their content on Jamii Forums strongly contradict these assertions. 
Respondents on Jamii Forums generally demonstrated a strong interest in this topic and 
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engaged in vigorous debates with one another over U.S. military and/or AFRICOM 
involvement in Tanzania, and Africa in general.  
A total of two hundred and thirty-five responses were collected and coded. 
Positive responses constituted 10% of total responses, neutral 41%, and negative 49%.  
Another aspect of this assessment was to record what was referenced by respondents in 
their posts; either AFRICOM in Tanzania, another African state, or a general comment. 
The purpose of tracking what respondents referenced was to see with what frequency 
Tanzanians are concerned with the command vis a vis Tanzania specifically. The results 
reinforce that the Tanzanian public is engaged with the topic of AFRICOM as it directly 
relates to Tanzania, 36% of posts were about AFRICOM in Tanzania. Of the remaining 
posts 12% referenced AFRICOM in another African state, predominantly focusing on 
other East African states and the U.S. intervention in Libya. And 52% of posts were 
general in nature, lacking a reference to a specific country, and focused on the theoretical 
policy implications of the command. 
Overall, the responses on Jamii Forums showed a greater balance between the 
negative and neutral perspectives than newspaper coverage and there were also a higher 
percentage of positive responses than in newspaper coverage. It is difficult to know 
definitively why Jamii Forum respondents had a more balanced, and overall more 
positive, view of AFRICOM. One possibility is the fact that the Tanzanian public has a 
generally favorable view of the U.S. Research by the Pew Global Attitudes project in 
2007 found 46% of Tanzanians had a favorable view of the U.S. and 49% favorability of 
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U.S consideration for other countries interests. That percentage had increased to 65% by 
2008 (“Tanzania: Opinion of the United States,” n.d.). Another factor could be Tanzanian 
news source choices. Since it is common knowledge the Tanzanian government restricts 
information regarding security issues it is possible many Tanzanians rely on outside, 
primarily internet, news sources for information on U.S. and Tanzanian security policies, 
potentially reducing negative perceptions of AFRICOM. Another possibility is 
respondents on Jamii Forums represent the more educated and engaged policy elites in 
Tanzania since participation on Jamii Forums would require access to a computer, 
technology skills, and a more sophisticated knowledge of foreign and security policy.  
 
Conclusion 
“Tanzania is a peaceful country but there are many things below the surface and, 
with the right spark, there could be chaos.” This remark a Tanzanian made to the author 
highlights that the challenge for AFRICOM’s engagement in Tanzania is correctly 
identifying, and subsequently addressing, those security issues which could either spark 
or fuel instability. Tanzania has a wide array of security, including human security, 
challenges with which to contend. The transnational issues of violent extremism, drug 
trafficking, and piracy pose real threats to stability and security and cannot be 
overlooked. Yet focusing on these issues alone ignores the everyday insecurity 
Tanzanians face which, over time, compound into transnational threats and fuel internal 
instabilities. Human insecurity constitutes the foundation of these transnational 
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challenges, is the most prevalent in the lives of Tanzanians, and are indeed those which 
most concern them.  
The results of this analysis pertain specifically to research question three. As a 
whole, AFRICOM does not foster a positive public perception of itself in Tanzania. The 
results of the content analysis have several implications for AFRICOM. First, these 
results show AFRICOM’s activities are, by and large, not resonating with the Tanzanian 
population. As a whole, the views expressed also indicate there is skepticism that U.S. 
security policy in Tanzania is really intended to benefit Tanzania or include it as an equal 
partner. Therefore, the predominantly negative view in newspapers and somewhat 
ambiguous view of AFRICOM on Jamii Forums suggests there is significant work to be 
done in terms of the command’s public outreach and relations. The content analysis 
results of the newspaper An-Nuur show this is particularly true in Tanzania’s Muslim 
communities. 
 While some of the views expressed in either newspapers or Jamii Forums 
indicate fundamental, and likely unalterable, philosophical opposition to the U.S. 
military, many of the negative or ambivalent views were based off misinformation or a 
lack thereof. The overwhelmingly negative view of AFRICOM in Swahili publications is 
also instructive and is perhaps indicative that the command would benefit from doing 
more outreach through Swahili language mediums. Although a stronger public outreach 
effort to the Tanzanian public is unlikely to result in a sea change of public opinion, 
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improving the command’s in-country communication strategy serves U.S. interests by 















































Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
This research fills a gap in the existing literature by contributing an in-depth 
evaluation of AFRICOM in a single African state. This case study of Tanzania sought to 
answer three questions: what is the impact of AFRICOM in executing U.S. national 
security policy in Tanzania? How and to what extent has AFRICOM addressed the 
conditions of human insecurity? And does AFRICOM foster a positive public perception 
in Tanzania?  
 
What is the impact of AFRICOM on executing U.S. national security policy in 
Tanzania? 
To answer the first question this research utilized interviews with U.S. officials 
and personnel, publically available information about the command’s activities in 
Tanzania, and detailed the most immediate human and tradition security challenges in 
Tanzania. The fact that Tanzania willingly participates in almost all of the AFRICOM 
security cooperation training programs and exercises for which it is eligible shows that 
the command is effectively executing U.S. national security policy. Tanzania’s high level 
of participation also signals a convergence in U.S. and Tanzanian threat perceptions, 
reflecting that U.S. security policy actually does address security issues which the 
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Tanzanian government finds important. In addition, the evidence from the interviews 
indicates that AFRICOM is having a positive impact on bilateral relations because 
Tanzania has seen the resources and attention it can leverage, and the merits of having a 
single point of contact for the U.S. military. Cultivating strong bilateral ties is important 
for both the current and future execution and success of U.S. national security policy. 
Both of these have positive implications for U.S. security and strategic interests and 
support the views of proponents of AFRICOM that it brings improved focus, 
coordination, and resources to U.S. Africa policy.  
 
To what extent has AFRICOM addressed the conditions of human insecurity in 
Tanzania? 
To answer the second question this research analyzed the command’s training 
exercise activities in Tanzania and interview responses in relation to the background 
analysis on the country’s security challenges. This analysis indicates that AFRICOM is 
addressing human security issues, but these efforts and impacts are confined to the 
Tanzanian military. AFRICOM’s primary means of engagement are through partner 
security cooperation training and exercises with the Tanzanian military, and there was 
some breadth to the command’s engagement, including training and exercises on 
humanitarian crises, pandemics etc. Nonetheless, the table of AFRICOM’s training and 
exercises with AFRICOM and interviews with officials familiar with the command’s 
engagement with Tanzania revealed that the primary locus of concern for AFRICOM in 
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its execution of U.S. security policy is more traditional security challenges. While partner 
military capacity building is necessary, recent events in Mali underscore that it is 
insufficient to ensuring stability, security, and preventing conflict.  
Security in Tanzania is fundamentally about human security. The daily concerns 
of ordinary Tanzanians are the country’s chronic poverty, education, and health systems 
and the Tanzanian government has placed these issues at the top of its agendas.  
AFRICOM’s current activities in Tanzania have minimal focus and impact on Tanzania’s 
human security, the primary threats the country faces. Given that AFRICOM’s ultimate 
objective is centered on conflict prevention, a broader approach will be essential if U.S. 
national security policy is to successfully prevent instability and conflict. 
 
What is the public perception about AFRICOM among the Tanzanian public?  
To answer the third question this research conducted a content analysis of Swahili 
and English language newspapers and an online discussion forum in Tanzania, coding 
articles and responses about AFRICOM based on attitudinal measures. The results of this 
content analysis show that there is a high degree of engagement with the topic of 
AFRICOM amongst the Tanzanian public. Overall public opinion of the command leans 
negative, and is decidedly negative in Swahili language mediums. 
The content analysis revealed that, overall, the Tanzanian public views 
AFRICOM with suspicion. Their belief that AFRICOM, at best, is narrowly focused on 
terrorism and, at worst, is using security as a guise for its neo-imperial ambitions shows 
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that the command faces serious challenges regarding its activities and public image. A 
highly plausible explanation for these views is misperception, stemming from both the 
U.S. and Tanzania. From the Tanzanian side, the public’s misperception stems from a 
lack of information regarding U.S. foreign policy, the means by which those policies are 
executed, and their overall intent. Misperception on the part of the U.S. stems from a lack 
of understanding the historic and contemporary undercurrents of Tanzania which shape 
its public’s perceptions of insecurity and national interest, and then failing to configure 
and execute U.S. policy in Tanzania accordingly. The prevalence of these negative views 
highlights how crucial it is from both a security and diplomatic standpoint that 
Tanzania’s human security threats remain a top priority for U.S. government efforts. 
Indeed a former U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania stated, in reference to Tanzania, 
“Development is the driving force of our diplomatic strength, but also who we are and 
what we’re known for” (personal communication). 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence from this case study suggests that in Tanzania AFRICOM has 
largely failed to achieve the articulated vision of a “combatant command plus.” This can 
be attributed to a complex confluence of factors: interagency buy-in and capacity, 
institutional culture, and the inherent limits of being a military organization. In the end, 
AFRICOM is a military organization, inherently its functions are military in nature and 
its primary counterpart will be another country’s military. The original articulations about 
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the command and their emphasis on jointness and whole of government approaches are 
not, in themselves, inherently problematic or incompatible within the constructs of a 
military organization. Rather, this vision for AFRICOM stretched the command beyond 
what the bounds of a military-military relationship allow. Not achieving the original 
vision for the command also stems from more complicated realities surrounding civilian 
capacity in the U.S. government, interagency incorporation into the command, and the 
sources of AFRICOM’s funding. All of these factors directly impact AFRICOM’s ability 
to carry out its whole of government modus operandi, engage in long term planning, and 
calibrate its activities according to the needs of individual African states.  
Critics of AFRICOM charge the command represents the militarization of U.S. 
Africa policy. Indeed it is important for the U.S. military to be mindful of avoiding an 
overreach in Africa, and to work in cooperation with African states; not simply pursuing 
a one-dimensional concept of U.S. strategic interests. However, this criticism misses two 
crucial points. First, this critique fails to acknowledge the fact that all aspects of U.S. 
engagement in Africa have been on the rise, including humanitarian and development aid. 
For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) represent a more extensive investment of 
U.S. resources than AFRICOM. The MCC currently has fifteen compacts with African 
states, totaling $5.8 billion and its ten threshold program grants in Africa total $160 
million (“Africa,” n.d.). In its first four years (FY2004-FY2008) the Bush Administration 
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spent $18.1 billion dollars in PEPFAR funds, making it the largest bi-lateral health 
initiative in the world (Salaam-Blyther, 2012, p. 2).  
By comparison, AFRICOM’s start-up budget in FY 2007 was $51 million and its 
FY 2008 first year operating budget was approximately $154 million. Its FY2013 request 
of $285 million represents the highest amount of funding to date (Ploch, 2011). The 
funding of only two U.S. bi-lateral assistance programs (MCC and PEPFAR) eclipses 
AFRICOM’s funding. Militarization would require a level of funding which exceeds and 
overwhelms all other aspects of bi-lateral assistance. In the case of Tanzania, 
development and health assistance constituted $506 million of the total $549 million of 
U.S. bi-lateral assistance to Tanzania in FY 2011, with military and security related 
funding receiving only $43 million (Dagne, 2010). Arguing AFRICOM represents a 
militarization of U.S. Africa policy ignores the concurrent significant rise in funding for 
U.S. humanitarian and development assistance programs for Africa.  
Second, by arguing the U.S. is militarizing its Africa policy, critics posit a 
reductionist view of the agency of African leaders to pursue the geo-strategic interests of 
their states. Insisting U.S. Africa policy retain an ostensibly humanitarian and 
development focus perpetuates a paternalistic view of Africa vis a vis the U.S. The U.S. 
military is a central part of its foreign policy apparatus, and is a status quo aspect of U.S. 
foreign relations. Engaging African states in broader strategic terms is an important step 
in the normalization and maturation of U.S. relations in the region, as well as the rise of 
African states in international politics. It is disingenuous to insist that African states stop 
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being treated as humanitarian basket cases, then criticize evolutions which add dynamism 
and broader forms of engagement to U.S. Africa policy. 
Nonetheless, by failing to incorporate a more substantial whole of government 
approach and to broaden its vision of security threats, AFRICOM’s execution of U.S. 
national security policy in Tanzania falls short. The U.S. military cannot and should not 
be expected to assume the responsibility for U.S. development and diplomacy in 
Tanzania. But an exclusive focus on the Tanzanian military narrows the command’s 
focus to the point where it has neglected to engage in other areas which have significant 
bearing on security. Grappling with the whole of government approach and its dilemma’s 
and tensions requires ongoing policy evaluation, informed by assessments of in-country 
conditions. The challenge, then, for the U.S. military and interagency is to bridge this 
divide; expanding the military’s capacity and scope while also ensuring that AFRICOM 
is working within its purview in the wider U.S. government system. Broadening 
AFRICOM’s scope of engagement beyond the counterpart country’s military demands 
ongoing deliberative processes. 
The analysis of AFRICOM’s in-country activities in Tanzania, including 
programs and exercises, indicate that AFRICOM is more of a traditional combatant 
command than articulated at its inception. As a more traditional combatant command, 
AFRICOM emphasizes military-to-military partner capacity building and engagement as 
a means to address security threats. This is in contrast to the founding vision of 
AFRICOM as a revolutionary new interagency command, one which pursued 
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development and human security objectives, and embodied the state building lessons of 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  
AFRICOM’s engagement with Tanzania is valuable and germane for state and 
regional security and stability. Tanzania’s contribution of troops to the recently 
authorized UN offensive combat force in Eastern Congo and a Tanzanian General being 
named as the head of this regional offensive force illustrates the important, and growing, 
peace and security role Tanzania plays in the region. Partner capacity building in states 
not experiencing instability or conflict is critical to mitigating those issues when they 
arise, both in the state and regionally, and preventing conflict recurrence. Tanzania’s role 
in the UN offensive combat force is just one example of the necessity of its military 
having the capacity to fulfill this role, and demonstrates the regional security dividends 
from AFRICOM’s engagement and programs.  
 Ultimately this analysis found a disconnect between U.S. policy priorities and the 
reality of the security threats on-the-ground. Though AFRICOM’s partner capacity 
building with the Tanzanian military is important for state and regional security and is in 
accordance with the wishes of the country’s leadership, many of Tanzania’s security 
issues remain unaddressed by AFRICOM. More is required than building the military’s 
capacity and focusing on the macro-level aspects of these threats. U.S. concerns over 
piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking etc. should not be set aside but rather, left unaddressed, 
the micro-level of these threats are persistent human insecurity.  While interagency 
personnel issues, funding, and restraints on the purview of the U.S. military mean it is 
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unlikely that AFRICOM will become a whole of government combatant command, it 
does need to have a greater emphasis on human security in Tanzania. Engaging in 
security sector reform, specifically policy training, would be a means by which 
AFRICOM could have a greater impact on human security while also addressing 
transnational threats affecting U.S. interests, and stay in its institutional lane.  
The selection of a case study approach for this research naturally leads to 
questions of the merits and generalizability of such an approach and its conclusions. In 
terms of merits, a probing case study afforded a more in-depth look at AFRICOM’s 
impacts as well as a more thorough assessment of an African state in which the U.S. has 
growing security and strategic interests than in the current literature. While it is both 
difficult and ill advised to generalize the findings of this case study to all African states, 
this research provides valuable insights regarding states similar to Tanzania. Therefore, 
the generalizability of this case study’s findings most directly apply to tier-two countries 
in Africa that the U.S. is working to cultivate stronger ties with and which have a 
relatively good level of stability. Another area in which this research can be more broadly 
generalized is in terms of AFRICOM’s public relations and outreach, the extent to which 
those efforts impact public opinion. Perhaps the most important generalizable finding 
from this case study is that the command, and U.S. policy in general, need to be 
cognizant of the role local context and culture play when it comes to public opinion of 





There are some limitations to this assessment. The first relates to the content 
analysis content reliability and the generalizability of the assessment. In regards to 
content reliability, searches may not have resulted in every article from each newspaper 
publication being found, potentially reducing the assessments accuracy. Many of the 
newspaper articles were published within a fairly recent timeframe, usually only 
stretching back to 2009. The second limitation is that this data comes from a small 
sampling of Tanzanian newspapers, limiting the ability to assemble a comprehensive 
picture of Tanzanian attitudes and make generalizations for the entire population of 
Tanzania. However the fact that there are over three-hundred and fifty registered news 
publications in Tanzania would make the time needed to go through each of them 
prohibitively long.  
Limitations of the social media content analysis mostly stem from the fact that 
most of the responses were in Swahili which needed to be translated before being coded. 
A native Swahili speaker was consulted when translation difficulties or questions arose to 
minimize mistranslation and coding mistakes. Another limitation was knowing whether 
or not a respondent was a Tanzanian. Though that information was unavailable, to 
mitigate this issue coded responses were again coded regarding whether or not they 
referred to Tanzania or other African states.  
A second limitation relates to the ability to generalize about the impact of 
AFRICOM on U.S. national security policy due to the fact that no Tanzanian government 
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officials were interviewed. Tanzania has a much more closed approach to government 
and security issues. Efforts were made to contact Tanzanian government officials, and 
even a couple journalists, were unsuccessful and no one would grant an interview. 
Therefore, interviews with U.S. officials were the only means to acquire attitudinal 





 The content analysis revealed a high degree of negativity towards AFRICOM in 
the Tanzanian public. Islamic publications demonstrated even more extreme antagonisms 
towards the command. Stemming from the results of this research, a point for further 
research regarding AFRICOM in Tanzania would be an in-depth assessment of the 
command’s public outreach strategy and efforts, particularly to Muslim communities 
since they seemingly feel targeted by U.S. counter terror efforts. While these views may 
not be alterable, it would be instructive to assess current U.S. outreach efforts to the 
Tanzanian public and whether or not public outreach is considered an important 
component for U.S. national security policy, its current impacts, and potential impact if 
any aspects were to be altered. This research would require extensive interview work 
throughout AFRICOM and various communities in Tanzania, particularly Muslim 
communities. Further research into this area would be beneficial for understanding 
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